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1 Introduction
The evidence of price dispersion within markets is overwhelming, even when products
are homogeneous (as reviewed by Baye et al. (2006)). Such price dispersion has a long-
standing interest within the areas of industrial organization and marketing, but is also
gaining increased attention from finance, development economics, and macroeconomics.1
Empirical findings show that much price dispersion is due to temporary price reductions
or ‘sales’ (e.g. Hitsch et al. (2019), Kaplan and Menzio (2015), Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008), Hosken and Reiffen (2004)). One of the main theoretical explanations for such sales
involves mixed strategies that arise from variation in consumers’ search frictions and/or the
existence of moderate advertising costs.2 This literature continues to offer deep insights
into sales, and is also receiving a renewed interest as an analytical foundation for many
broader research areas, including price comparison platforms, advertising, obfuscation,
choice complexity, and several issues within macroeconomics.3
However, while the predictions of such mixed strategy sales models are frequently con-
sistent with empirical evidence, they often struggle to fully explain the observed differences
in firms’ pricing and advertising behaviors.4 In particular, their restricted ability to allow
for firm heterogeneity constrains the theoretical and empirical understanding of sales, and
inhibits the wider related literatures. Indeed, as Baye and Morgan (2009, p.1151) state
“...little is known about asymmetric models within this class. Breakthroughs on this front
would not only constitute a major theoretical advance, but permit a tighter fit between the
underlying theory and empirics”.
In response, this paper presents a substantially generalized ‘clearinghouse’ framework
of advertised sales (e.g. Baye and Morgan (2001), Baye et al. (2004a)) and explores
some example applications. Our main contribution is methodological - while its modeling
assumptions sometimes differ to existing research, our framework can extend many of
the past literature’s sales predictions to more complex market settings while allowing
for multiple dimensions of firm heterogeneity. Thus, we hope that our framework will
1E.g. Woodward and Hall (2012), Allen et al. (2014); Jensen (2007); Nakamura et al. (2018).
2E.g. Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983), Stahl (1989), Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004);
Robert and Stahl (1993), Baye and Morgan (2001). See Baye et al. (2006) and Anderson and Renault
(2018) for reviews.
3For reviews and recent examples, see Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest (2012), Armstrong (2015),
Spiegler (2015), and Ronayne (2019). For macroeconomic applications to nominal rigidities, output
fluctuations and monetary policy, see Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011), Kaplan and Menzio (2016), and
Burdett and Menzio (2017).
4E.g. Lach (2002), Baye et al. (2004a), Baye et al. (2004b), Lewis (2008), Chandra and Tappata (2011),
Wildenbeest (2011), Giulietti et al. (2014), Lach and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2017), Zhang et al. (2018) and
Pennerstorfer et al. (2019). Also see Potters and Suetens (2013) for experimental evidence.
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help open up the future analysis of many remaining questions within the sales literature.
As some examples, the paper then provides original insights into the number and type
of firms that use sales, offers new predictions about the effects of firm asymmetries on
market outcomes, and illustrates how the framework can be used to i) extend a ‘cleaning’
procedure that is commonly used in the empirical literature, and ii) analyze a family of
activities in sales markets, including persuasive advertising and obfuscation.
As reviewed by Baye et al. (2006), the original clearinghouse framework considers a
symmetric market with a single homogeneous good. Consumers are potentially split into
‘non-shoppers’ that are only willing to buy from a designated firm, and ‘shoppers’ that can
buy from any firm. Firms choose their price, and whether to inform consumers of this price
via some advertising channel. As consistent with observed sales behavior, the equilibrium
involves each firm randomizing between selecting a high price without advertising, and
advertising a lower price drawn from some support. The seminal model of sales by Varian
(1980) obtains as the limiting case when advertising costs tend to zero.
We modify this clearinghouse framework in two important respects. First, we recast the
firms as competing in (net) utility rather than prices. By drawing on the (symmetric, pure-
strategy) model of competition in the utility space by Armstrong and Vickers (2001), we
let each firm i select its utility, ui, with a per-consumer profit function, pii(ui), that depends
upon the firm’s underlying demand, products, costs, and pricing technology. With little
increase in computation, this facilitates a high level of generality across complex market
settings, involving downward-sloping demand, multiple products, or two-part tariffs, where
the analysis of sales would often be otherwise impenetrable.
Second, we make a subtle change to the tie-break rule when the shoppers are indif-
ferent over which firm to trade with. The existing literature assumes shoppers i) trade
exclusively with advertising firm(s) in any tie between advertising and non-advertising
firms, and ii) mix between the tied firms with equal probability in any other form of tie.
Although consistent with an advertising channel involving a price-comparison platform
where shoppers face additional visit costs to buy from non-listed firms (Baye and Morgan
(2001)), it turns out that this ‘traditional’ tie-break rule impedes the analysis of sales
under firm heterogeneity. In particular, it causes a substantial loss in tractability by i)
making the exact form of equilibrium become dependent upon parameter sub-cases, and
ii) prompting the existence of mass points in some firms’ advertised price distributions.5
5For instance, even in a simple unit demand duopoly where firms only differ in their shares of non-
shoppers, the equilibrium in Arnold et al. (2011) has two parameter sub-cases and one firm uses a mass
point in advertised prices. Furthermore, the equilibrium does not converge to standard sales equilibria as
advertising costs tend to zero (e.g. Narasimhan (1988)).
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To resolve this problem, we take a different approach within a setting where shoppers
receive all adverts before making their visit decisions. Here, we are free to select any
tie-break rule because shoppers should be willing to buy from any advertising or non-
advertising firm with the same expected utility. Moreover, rather than treating the tie-
break rule as a modeling assumption, we are free to specify the tie-break rule as part of
equilibrium in line with Simon and Zame’s (1990) concept of ‘endogenous sharing rules’
(which they use to offer general results about equilibrium existence in n-player games).
Under our assumptions, we show that the ‘equilibrium tie-break rule’ is uniquely defined
for any firm that uses sales. This rule partially offsets any firm heterogeneities and ensures
that all firms that use sales have the same incentive to employ a common upper bound in
advertised utilities. In symmetric settings, it coincides with the traditional tie-break rule.
However, in asymmetric settings, it offers a unique level of tractability by removing any
parameter sub-cases and eliminating any mass points in advertised utility distributions.
As such, it allows us to simultaneously permit i) any variation in firms’ shares of non-
shoppers, ii) any variation in firms’ advertising costs, and iii) considerable variation in
firms’ profit functions. In equilibrium, firms may vary in advertising probabilities, utility
distributions, and profits depending on the level and form of heterogeneity.6
Sections 2 and 3 introduce the framework and equilibrium analysis. We first present
the equilibrium under duopoly, and show how it can generalize many predictions from the
previous literature to more complex market settings with multiple forms of heterogeneity.7
In addition, we offer further new insights by characterizing some common forms of sales
that have remained unstudied within the clearinghouse literature, including cases where
firms use two-part tariffs or non-price variables such as package size (e.g ‘X% Free’).
We then present the equilibrium for n > 2 firms. Here, the previous literature with
heterogeneous firms is particularly scant - in a simple setting of unit demand and zero
advertising costs, it suggests that only two firms can ever engage in sales behavior (Baye
et al. (1992), Kocas and Kiyak (2006) and Shelegia (2012)). In contrast, and in better
line with typical empirical findings (e.g. Lach (2002), Lewis (2008), Chandra and Tappata
(2011)), our framework explains how any number of heterogeneous firms k∗ ∈ [2, n] can
engage in equilibrium sales. In particular, we demonstrate how a rise in the cost of
informative advertising can lead to an increase in the number of firms that use advertised
6The variation in profit functions is subject to a condition that is implicit within all of the existing
literature - each firm would offer the same utility under monopoly, umi = u
m ≥ 0 ∀i. This does not restrict
each firm’s monopoly profits, and is innocuous in several market settings, including unit demand.
7Among many others, these include symmetric models such as Varian (1980), Baye et al. (2004a),
Baye et al. (2006), and Simester (1997), and asymmetric models, such as Narasimhan (1988), Baye et al.
(1992), Kocas and Kiyak (2006), and Wildenbeest (2011).
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sales. Intuitively, despite the direct cost increase, higher advertising costs can prompt
more firms to use sales by softening competition for the shoppers. Thus, if the costs of
informative advertising fall in the digital era, we predict that fewer firms will engage in
sales behavior. Finally, we provide a broad characterization of the types of firms that are
most likely to use advertised sales. Ceteris paribus, these are firms with relatively low
shares of loyal consumers, low advertising costs, and high profitability (under reasonable
assumptions on market conditions). These results offer some clear empirical predictions,
but currently remain untested within the literature.8
Section 4 explores some applications to illustrate how our framework can be used for
future research. Section 4.1 uses the framework to assess and extend a common procedure
within the large empirical literature on sales and price dispersion. This ‘cleaning’ proce-
dure attempts to remove the effects of firm-level heterogeneities from raw price data by
retrieving the residuals from a price regression involving firm-level fixed-effects.9 Wilden-
beest (2011) verifies the theoretical validity of the procedure in a setting of unit demand
and zero advertising costs where the firms differ in quality and costs, but share the same
value-cost margin. However, our more general framework shows how the procedure is
invalid i) for downward-sloping demand (because the relationship between firms’ offered
prices and utilities becomes non-linear), and ii) under unit demand outside Wildenbeest’s
condition (because the firms no longer offer the same average utility). Moreover, we then
offer the basis for modified methodologies that may be applied instead.
Section 4.2 uses the framework to study a family of games where each firm’s share of
non-shoppers is determined endogenously as a function of the firms’ actions prior to sales
competition. Among other examples, such actions are consistent with forms of persuasive
advertising, sales-force methods, and obfuscation. Starting with Chioveanu (2008), Carlin
(2009) and Wilson (2010), some related streams of literature have become popular in recent
years.10 However, almost all such models are based upon simple market settings with zero
costs of informative advertising. An exception is Baye and Morgan (2009), but due to the
consequent difficulties of analyzing asymmetries, they are unable to consider all possible
subgames. Instead, they show the existence of a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria
8Existing empirical studies often focus on different factors affecting firms’ use of sales, such as market
information, competition, or rivals’ behavior (e.g. Lewis (2008), Chandra and Tappata (2011), Shankar
and Bolton (2004), Ellickson and Misra (2008)).
9The residuals are then used in i) reduced-form studies of price dispersion, e.g. Sorensen (2000), Lach
(2002), Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Barron et al. (2004), Lewis (2008), Chandra and Tappata (2011),
Pennerstorfer et al. (2019), and Sherman and Weiss (2017), or ii) structural estimations, e.g. Wildenbeest
(2011), Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2013), Giulietti et al. (2014), Allen et al. (2014), and An et al. (2017).
10For a review, and for some wider related models, see Grubb (2015) and Spiegler (2015).
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and a unique symmetric equilibrium in secure strategies. In contrast, our framework
can characterize the unique symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium across a general
market setting. Moreover, while their equilibria imply that an increase in the cost of
informative advertising can have a positive, negative or zero effect on the prior actions,
our framework offers a unique empirically testable prediction. As the costs of informative
advertising decrease, sales markets should experience i) a reduction in loyalty-enhancing
actions, such as persuasive advertising, and ii) an increase in loyalty-reducing actions,
such as some forms of obfuscation. This offers a first theoretical connection between the
costs of informative advertising and equilibrium levels of persuasive advertising, and gives
a new advertising-costs-based explanation for why firms increase their obfuscation tactics
in response to advances in digital technology (e.g. Ellison and Ellison (2009)).
Finally, Section 4.3 provides some new comparative static results that could be utilized
for future research regarding the effects of firm-level characteristics on sales and market
performance. For instance, standard results show that an industry-wide increase in ad-
vertising costs deters the use of sales and raises firms’ profits. However, we can isolate
the effects of an increase in a single firm’s advertising costs - we show that firms still
reduce their use of sales, but that it is rival rather than own advertising costs that matter
in determining profits. Similarly, we isolate the effects of an increase in an individual
firm’s share of non-shoppers. In contrast to results under the traditional tie-break rule
(e.g. Arnold et al. (2011)), this induces the firm to set lower average utility offers as more
consistent with standard results under zero advertising costs (e.g. Narasimhan (1988)).
Lastly, we study changes in firms’ profit functions or ‘profitability’. These results are
new even in a symmetric industry-wide setting - an industry-wide increase in profitability,
such as a reduction in costs or an increase in per-consumer demand, will always increase
firms’ use of sales. Further, an increase in a single firm’s profitability will increase its sale
probability and prompt it to use higher average offers in most common market settings.
Related Literature: Armstrong and Vickers (2001) introduced competition in utility to
study price discrimination in a symmetric, pure-strategy setting. In contrast, we transfer
their utility approach into an asymmetric (clearinghouse) model to study mixed strategy
sales. Some past sales papers have referred to competition in utility (Simester (1997),
Hosken and Reiffen (2007), Wildenbeest (2011), Dubovik and Janssen (2012), Anderson
et al. (2015)). However, they only use it to compute equilibria in specific settings, and do
not use the associated profit function, pi(u), to explore any general results or implications.
In a recent paper, Armstrong and Vickers (2019) take a different line. They use a dual
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approach by writing an individual consumer’s surplus as a function of the associated
per-consumer profit to analyze the effects of price discrimination within a duopoly sales
model with asymmetric shares of non-shoppers. Some other work also exists in non-
clearinghouse settings. First, Anderson et al. (2015) allow for firm heterogeneity in a model
where firms must advertise to earn positive profits, and where all consumers are shoppers.
Contrary to us, they find that only two firms can ever use advertised sales when firms are
heterogeneous. As such, they cannot analyze how market factors affect the number and
type of firms that use sales, or connect to the larger theoretical or empirical clearinghouse
literature. Instead, they focus on some interesting results regarding equilibrium selection
and welfare. Second, some papers consider clearinghouse-style frameworks but under an
assumption of horizontally differentiated products (e.g. Galeotti and Moraga-Gonza´lez
(2009), Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest (2012)). These papers exhibit pure-strategy
price equilibria without price dispersion, and therefore do not share our focus on sales.
2 Model
Let there be n ≥ 2 firms, i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Also suppose there is a unit mass of risk-neutral
consumers that have a zero outside option. Each firm i competes by choosing a utility
offer (net of any associated payments), ui ∈ R≥0. All consumers have identical preferences
and so each consumer values firm i’s offer at precisely ui.
11
The maximum possible profit that firm i can extract per consumer when providing an
offer, ui, is defined as pii(ui). Following Armstrong and Vickers (2001), the exact source
of utility and form of profit function can depend upon a rich set of demand, product,
and cost conditions.12 We assume that pii(ui) is independent of the number of consumers
served.13 Further, to ensure that any sales equilibrium is well-behaved, we make some mild
technical assumptions: i) pii(ui) is strictly quasi-concave in ui with a unique maximizer
at firm i’s ‘monopoly utility’ level, umi ∈ [0,∞), ii) pii(umi ) ≡ pimi > 0, iii) pii(ui) is twice
11This assumption of identical preferences is standard within the mixed strategy sales literature. If, in
contrast, consumers’ preferences were sufficiently heterogeneous then any mixed strategy sales equilibrium
would be replaced by a pure strategy non-sales equilibrium.
12As two simple examples, consider the following where firm i sells a single good at price pi with
marginal cost ci. First, suppose each consumer has a unit demand and values firm i’s good at Vi. Firm
i’s utility offer is the associated consumer surplus, ui = Vi − pi, while its profits per consumer equal
pii(ui) = Vi− ci−ui. Second, let each consumer have a linear demand for firm i’s good, qi(pi) = ai− bipi.
Firm i’s utility offer equals ui = (ai − bipi)2/2bi, and by using pi = (ai −
√
2biui)/bi, one can write
pii(ui) =
1
bi
[ai − bici −
√
2biui][
√
2biui]. Further examples including more general downward-sloping
demand, multi-product firms, two-part tariffs, and non-price sales are later detailed in Appendix A.
13Similar to Armstrong and Vickers (2001), this is needed for the profit function to remain well-defined.
However, it rules out some empirically relevant features such as scale-economies or capacity constraints.
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continuously differentiable for all ui > u
m
i , and iv) there exists a finite break-even utility
uˆi > u
m
i where pii(uˆi) = 0.
Consumers are initially uninformed about firms’ utility offers. However, each firm can
choose whether or not to advertise in order to inform consumers of its offer, ηi ∈ {0, 1}.
In line with some previous versions of the clearinghouse model (e.g. Baye et al. (2004a)),
we assume i) all advertising must be truthful, ii) any advert is observed by all relevant
consumers, and iii) firms’ advertising costs are exogenous. However, in contrast to the
previous literature, we also assume that iv) advertising costs can differ across firms, as
consistent with different advertising capabilities or channels, and v) each firm’s advertising
cost is strictly positive, Ai > 0 ∀i.14
There are two types of consumers, ‘non-shoppers’ and ‘shoppers’, in respective pro-
portions, θ ∈ (0, 1) and (1− θ). Non-shoppers ignore all adverts. They simply visit their
designated ‘local’ firm and buy according to their underlying demand function, or exit.
Our framework allows the firms to have asymmetric shares of non-shoppers, θi > 0, with∑n
i=1 θi = θ. In contrast, the remaining ‘shopper’ consumers pay attention to adverts and
can buy from any firm. However, to simplify exposition, we assume that shoppers can
only visit one firm. Hence, shoppers choose between i) visiting an advertising firm to buy
from its known utility offer, ii) visiting a non-advertising firm to discover its utility offer
and potentially buy, or iii) exiting the market immediately.15
We analyze the following game. In Stage 1, each firm chooses its utility offer, ui ∈ R≥0,
and its advertising decision, ηi ∈ {0, 1}. To allow for mixed strategies, define i) αi ∈ [0, 1]
as firm i’s advertising probability, ii) FAi (u) as firm i’s utility distribution when advertising,
and iii) FNi (u) as firm i’s utility distribution when not advertising, both on support
R≥0. In Stage 2, consumers observe any adverts, form beliefs about the (expected) utility
provided by any non-advertising firm, uei , and then make their visit and purchase decisions
in accordance with the strategies outlined above.
We define a ‘tie’ as any situation where the shoppers are indifferent over visiting a set
of firms, T , where |T | ∈ [2, n]. Any firm within the tied set, i ∈ T , must have advertised
(or be expected to offer) a common level of utility, u, while any firm outside the tie, j 6= T ,
must have advertised (or be expected to offer) a utility strictly lower than u. A ‘tie-break
rule’ then assigns the probability (or proportion) with which the shoppers visit each tied
14Strictly positive advertising costs help ensure that each firm refrains from advertising with positive
probability in our later equilibrium. This is needed for our tie-break rule to be effective in providing
tractability. See footnote 22 for more.
15These assumptions can be substantially generalized by allowing shoppers to visit firms sequentially
provided that i) the cost of any first visit is not too large, and ii) each shopper may only purchase from
a single firm (‘one-stop shopping’). For technical details see Appendix C2.
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firm. In particular, for any i ∈ T , let firm i’s ‘tie-break probability’, xi(η, u, T ) ∈ [0, 1],
depend upon the tied firms’ advertising decisions, η = {ηi}i∈T , the tied utility level, u,
and the set of tied firms, T, where
∑
i∈T xi(η, u, T ) = 1.
The existing literature assumes that shoppers i) trade exclusively and symmetrically
with advertised firm(s) in any tie between advertised and non-advertised firms, and ii)
trade symmetrically with all tied firms in any other form of tie. This can be sum-
marized as follows for n = 2: x1((1, 0), u, {1, 2}) = 1, x1((0, 1), u, {1, 2}) = 0, and
x1((1, 1), u, {1, 2}) = x1((0, 0), u, {1, 2}) = 0.5 for all u. In contrast, while we also as-
sume that xi(·) is independent of u, we depart from the literature’s approach in two ways.
First, we assume that the tie-break probabilities are independent of firms’ advertising
decisions. In particular, Assumption X lets the tie-break probabilities depend only on the
set of tied firms, T . While this assumption may be restrictive in some situations, it permits
sufficient flexibility for us to manipulate the tie-break rule. Furthermore, Assumption X
remains consistent with our context where shoppers receive all adverts before making their
visit decisions and so have no reason to favor advertising firms.16
xi(η, u, T ) = xi(T ) ∀η, u (Assumption X)
Second, instead of assuming that the tie-break probabilities are otherwise symmetric,
xi(T ) = |T |−1, we build on the concept of endogenous sharing rules (Simon and Zame
(1990)) to specify them endogenously as part of the game equilibrium. Hence, we focus on
perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), where in addition to specifying the players’ equilibrium
strategies and beliefs, we also specify the profile of equilibrium tie-break probabilities,
x∗(T )= {x∗1(T ), ..., x∗n(T )}, for all possible T . As detailed below, this approach, together
with Assumption X, will allow us to manipulate the tie-break probabilities to help improve
equilibrium tractability.
Finally, we discuss two remaining assumptions. First, while our framework offers a
significant increase in generality, it cannot avoid an assumption that is implicit across the
entire previous literature. We are the first to state it:
umi = u
m ∀i (Assumption U)
This does not require firms to have the same monopoly price or the same monopoly
profits, only the same level of monopoly utility. However, Assumption U is not innocuous.
Although it is trivially satisfied under unit demand or two-part tariffs because umi is
16Footnote 19 also later explains how Assumption X can be partially relaxed.
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then always zero (given our assumption that all consumers have identical preferences), it
is restrictive under downward-sloping demand and linear prices. Here, one must either
i) restrict attention to symmetric profit functions pii(u) = pi(u), or ii) introduce some
binding lower bound on firms’ utility offers, umin ≥ min{umi , ..., umn }, as consistent with
an unmodeled competitive fringe, or a price cap policy when firms’ profit functions differ
only in costs. Outside Assumption U, the power of our tie-break approach is lost.17
Second, we let all firms have some basic potential to use advertised sales. Specifically,
we let each firm i’s profits from not advertising with ui = u
m and selling only to its
non-shoppers, θipi
m
i , be less than its profits from advertising an offer just above u
m and
gaining the shoppers, [θi + (1− θ)]pimi −Ai. The resulting Assumption A is relatively mild
and just ensures that each firm’s advertising cost is not prohibitively large.
Ai ≤ (1− θ)pimi ∀i (Assumption A)
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Section 3.1 considers some preliminary findings before Section 3.2 provides some results
on the equilibrium tie-break probabilities. Section 3.3 then completes the equilibrium
analysis for duopoly (n = 2), before Section 3.4 tackles the more complex case of a
broader oligopoly (n > 2). Any formal proofs are listed in Appendix B.
3.1 Preliminary Results
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, each firm i must set ui = u
m if it does not advertise,
ηi = 0, and set ui > u
m if it advertises, ηi = 1.
Any firm that does not advertise cannot use its unobserved utility offer to attract more
consumers. Instead, it will find it optimal to set the monopoly utility level, um, because
its non-shoppers and any visiting shoppers cannot visit elsewhere. In addition, no firm
will ever wish to advertise an offer of um. Specifically, any firm i that advertises um (with
positive probability) could profitably deviate by not advertising. By doing so, it would
reduce its advertising costs, Ai > 0, while having no impact on its units sold since xi(T )
is independent of advertising decisions via Assumption X.
17Suppose umi > u
m for some i. In the event where all firms set their monopoly utility, the shoppers
will then strictly prefer to visit firm i. As later explained, this implies there will be no ties in equilibrium.
Thus, the tie-break probabilities are redundant and cannot be used to ensure a tractable equilibrium.
10
Lemma 1 offers several implications. First, in equilibrium, if no advert is observed from
firm i, then shoppers must correctly believe uei = u
m. Moreover, if no adverts are observed
from any firm, then shoppers must believe that all the firms are tied with uei = u
m for
all i via Assumption U. Second, if firm i advertises, firm i’s lowest advertised utility will
always be strictly larger than its non-advertised utility, um. Therefore, from this point
forward, we will simply refer to firm i’s utility distribution unconditional on advertising,
Fi(u), where firm i sets u
m without advertising with probability 1− αi = Fi(um) ∈ [0, 1],
and uses advertised sales on u > um with total probability αi.
Firm i will then be said to use ‘sales’ if it advertises an offer above um with positive
probability, αi > 0. In any given equilibrium, we will refer to k
∗ as the number of firms
that use sales and K∗ as the set of firms that use sales. A ‘sales equilibrium’ will be
defined as any equilibrium where k∗ ≥ 1. In any given sales equilibrium, we will denote
u¯ > um as the minimum level of u for which Fi(u) = 1 for all i. By adapting standard
arguments, we can state:
Lemma 2. In any sales equilibrium, at least two firms use sales, k∗ ≥ 2, and for at least
two firms i and j, u is a point of increase of Fi(u) and Fj(u) at any u ∈ (um, u¯]. Any firm
which uses sales, i ∈ K∗, has no point masses in Fi(u) for u > um and advertises with an
interior probability, αi = 1−Fi(um) ∈ (0, 1). When n = 2, any sales equilibrium has both
firms advertising on (um, u¯] without gaps.
Thus, any firm that uses sales will set an unadvertised ‘regular’ offer of um with
probability (1− αi) ∈ (0, 1), together with randomized discounted offers u ∈ (um, u¯] with
probability αi.
18 When n = 2, Lemma 2 demonstrates that any sales equilibrium will
involve both firms using sales on the same full support (um, u¯]. However, when n > 2,
similar to the insights of Baye et al. (1992) for zero advertising costs, it implies that there
may be multiple forms of sales equilibria with firms using different supports. Indeed,
provided at least two firms mix on any given interval within (um, u¯], other advertising firms
need not be active on the same interval. Hence, to avoid these significant complications
and potential multiplicities when n > 2, we follow Chioveanu (2008) by focusing only on
sales equilibria where all advertising firms use the full convex support, (um, u¯]. Hence, for
all i with αi > 0, we assume u is a point of increase of Fi(u) for all u ∈ (um, u¯].
18This sales behavior is consistent with the empirical evidence cited in the introduction. While Hitsch
et al. (2019) find that firms use different regular prices, this need not be inconsistent with all firms using
regular offers of um provided the firms differ in (perceived) quality or service levels.
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3.2 Equilibrium Tie-Break Probabilities
Lemma 3. Ties can only occur with positive probability in equilibrium when all firms
refrain from advertising, ηi = 0 ∀i.
In contrast to the existing literature where ties are possible between non-advertising
and advertising firms, Lemma 3 shows that ties are only possible in our model when all
firms choose not to advertise. Hence, the only tie-break probability that can be relevant
in equilibrium is xi(N) where N denotes the set of all firms, and so from this point
forward, we simply denote xi(N) ≡ xi, and x∗ = {x∗1, ..., x∗n} as a set of equilibrium tie-
break probabilities. This difference to the literature arises from our Assumption X which
ensures that the tie-break rule is independent of firms’ advertising decisions.19
For a given x∗i , firm i’s expected profits from not advertising with ui = u
m equal
pimi [θi + (1− θ)x∗iΠj 6=i(1− αj)]. (1)
Firm i will always trade with its θi non-shoppers, but it will also trade with the (1 − θ)
shoppers if i) all other firms also choose not to advertise, which occurs with probability
Πj 6=i(1−αj), and ii) the shoppers visit i in the subsequent tie, which occurs with tie-break
probability x∗i .
If firm i uses sales in equilibrium, then we know from Lemma 2 that it must use
an interior probability, αi ∈ (0, 1). Hence, under the requirements of a mixed-strategy
equilibrium and our assumption that all advertising firms use the full support (um, u¯], firm
i must expect to earn the same level of equilibrium profits, Π¯i, from i) setting ui = u
m
and not advertising, and ii) advertising any ui ∈ (um, u¯]. We can then state the following.
Lemma 4. Consider any sales equilibrium with a given set of tie-break probabilities, x∗.
Then, if firm i uses sales, its equilibrium profits are uniquely defined as
Π¯i = θipi
m
i +
x∗i
1− x∗i
Ai. (2)
Hence, the equilibrium profits of any firm i that uses sales will derive from its share
of non-shoppers, θi, its advertising costs, Ai, and its equilibrium tie-break probability, x
∗
i .
19Assumption X can be partially relaxed. If, instead, advertising firms were assigned (slightly) lower
tie-break probabilities than non-advertising firms, then our results would not change - advertising um
would still be dominated and ties could still only occur when all firms refrain from advertising. However,
if advertising firms were assigned significantly higher tie-break probabilities than non-advertising firms,
we would move closer to the existing literature. Specifically, advertising um would not be dominated and
so ties could also exist between advertising and non-advertising firms at um in ways that would generate
the literature’s associated loss in equilibrium tractability.
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To begin to understand more about the equilibrium tie-break probabilities, it is useful
to now define the following expressions, where θ−i = θ − θi refers to the total share of
non-shoppers that are not designated to firm i:
χi(u) ≡ 1− Ai
pii(u)(1− θ−i)− θipimi
(3)
u˜i ≡ pi−1i
(
θipi
m
i + Ai
1− θ−i
)
. (4)
Intuitively, χi(u) is the level of x
∗
i at which firm i’s equilibrium profits, (2), are equal to
the maximum profits that firm i could obtain from advertising an offer, u, and successfully
attracting all the shoppers, pii(u)(1− θ−i)−Ai. Further, u˜i can then be understood as the
level of utility at which χi(u) = 0; where firm i’s maximum profits from advertising are
equal to its lowest possible profits from not advertising, θipi
m
i > 0. Hence, firm i will never
advertise ui > u˜i. Formally, we define χi(u) on [u
m, u˜i] with χ
′
i(u) < 0. Using Assumption
A, we then know that χi(u
m) = 1 − Ai
(1−θ)pimi ∈ [0, 1) is weakly larger than χi(u˜i) = 0, or
equivalently, u˜i ≥ um for all i.
Lemma 5. Consider any sales equilibrium with a given upper utility bound u¯ > um. Then,
if firm i uses sales, i) the upper bound must satisfy u¯ ≤ u˜i, and ii) firm i’s equilibrium
tie-break probability is uniquely defined as:
x∗i = χi(u¯). (5)
If firm i uses sales on ui ∈ (um, u¯], then we know from above that u˜i must be weakly
larger than u¯ in order for firm i to be willing to set offers up to u¯. Moreover, if firm i uses
sales, then its equilibrium profits, Π¯i, must equal its expected profits from advertising any
ui ∈ (um, u¯]. Hence, by setting Π¯i equal to its expected profits from advertising u¯, where it
would attract the shoppers for sure, (1− θ−i)pii(u¯)−Ai, we know that firm i’s equilibrium
tie-break probability, x∗i , must equal χi(u¯); any other xi 6= χi(u¯) is incompatible with a
sales equilibrium under our assumptions. Thus, the equilibrium tie-break probabilities for
any firms using sales must ensure that all such firms have exactly the same incentive to
employ the common upper utility bound, u¯.
To help understand this further, first consider a fully symmetric setting. Here, the firms
already have identical incentives and so (5) implies that any firms that engage in sales
will share a common equilibrium tie-break probability. More importantly, now consider
an example asymmetric setting where only firms 1 and 2 engage in sales, and where firm 1
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is relatively more willing to advertise higher utilities, u˜1 > u˜2.
20 In equilibrium, to ensure
that the firms have the same incentive to adopt a common upper bound, (5) implies
that firm 1 must be assigned a larger equilibrium tie-break probability, x∗1 > x
∗
2. This
acts to make firm 1 (firm 2) relatively less (more) aggressive by enhancing (reducing) its
expected payoffs from not advertising. However, as later shown, it is not the case that
x∗1 and x
∗
2 prompt the firms to play symmetric strategies. Thus, the equilibrium tie-break
probabilities do not fully neutralize the firms’ heterogeneities, they just partially offset
them.21
3.3 Duopoly (n = 2)
As now formalized, the equilibrium under duopoly is unique and takes one of two forms.
When advertising costs are sufficiently low, there is a sales equilibrium where both firms
engage in sales, otherwise, there is a non-sales equilibrium.
Lemma 6. When n = 2, any sales equilibrium has a unique upper utility bound, u¯,
(implicitly) defined by (6), and each firm’s advertising probability and offer distribution
are uniquely defined by (7) and (8).
χ1(u¯) + χ2(u¯) = 1 (6)
αi = 1− Aj
x∗i (1− θ)pimj
(7)
Fi(u) =
θj(pi
m
j − pij(u)) + (Aj/x∗i )
(1− θ)pij(u) (8)
When n = 2, previous results have shown that any sales equilibrium must involve
both firms and that x∗i = χi(u¯). Hence, as the tie-break probabilities must sum to one,
the unique equilibrium upper bound must satisfy (6). One can then derive each firm’s
advertising probability and offer distribution from the fact that each firm must earn its
equilibrium profits over u = um and u ∈ (um, u¯].22
20From inspection of (4), this could arise because firm 1 has a relatively lower advertising cost, A1,
a relatively lower share of non-shoppers, θ1, a relatively lower level of per-consumer profits at u
m, pim1 ,
and/or a relatively higher level of per-consumer profits at u¯, pi1(u¯).
21One may ask why the shoppers should behave in accordance with (5). Similar questions arise within
the wider concept of endogenous sharing rules. As noted by Simon and Zame (1990, p.863), “The answer
is, as always, that equilibrium theory never explains why any agents would act in any particular way.
Equilibrium theory is intended to explain how agents behave, not why.”
22In an extreme case where the firms are asymmetric but Ai = Aj → 0, the only way for the firms to
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Proposition 1 now shows that the characterized sales equilibrium exists uniquely if
advertising costs are sufficiently low, A1
pim1
+ A2
pim2
< 1− θ. In contrast, if advertising costs are
higher, the firms are deterred from competing against each other - instead, there exists a
unique non-sales equilibrium where both firms select um and refrain from advertising.
Proposition 1. Given Assumptions X, U and A, the game has the following unique
equilibrium (where consumers always expect non-advertising firms to offer um):
a) If advertising costs are low, A1
pim1
+ A2
pim2
< 1− θ, each firm i offers ui = um and does
not advertise with probability (1−αi) ∈ (0, 1) according to (7), and advertises a sale offer
ui ∈ (um, u¯] according to (8) with probability αi, where the upper bound, u¯, solves (6), and
firm i’s equilibrium tie-break probability, x∗i = 1− x∗j ∈ (0, 1), is given by (5).
b) If advertising costs are high, A1
pim1
+ A2
pim2
≥ 1− θ, both firms offer ui = um and never
advertise, αi = 0, and firm i’s equilibrium tie-break probability equals x
∗
i = 1 − x∗j ∈
[χi(u
m), 1− χj(um)].
One can demonstrate the implications of Proposition 1 by specifying the exact source
of utility and profit function. As a very simple example, consider a symmetric setting
with unit demand. Following footnote 12, let ui = V − pi and pi(ui) = V − c − ui,
where um = 0 and pim = V − c. Proposition 1 then implies a clearinghouse equilibrium
with x∗i = 0.5, Π¯i =
θ(V−c)
2
+ A, αi = 1 − 2A(1−θ)(V−c) , and u¯ = 2(1−θ)(V−c)−4A2−θ . By using
Fi(p) = 1−Fi(u), one can then further derive Fi(p) = 1− θ(V−p)+4A2(1−θ)(p−c) , with pm = V −um = V
and p = V − u¯ = c+ θ(V−c)+4A
2−θ . Further details and additional example settings involving
downward-sloping demand, and multi-product firms are included in Appendix A.
Appendix A also shows how Proposition 1 can be used to characterize two common
forms of sales that have remained unstudied within the clearinghouse literature. First, it
characterizes sales behavior when firms use two-part tariffs. Existing theoretical work is
very limited on this - we only know of Hendel et al. (2014) which shows how sales with
non-linear prices can emerge in a dynamic context with storable goods. In contrast, our
framework considers a simpler clearinghouse setting while allowing for full asymmetry. We
show that equilibrium sales will involve marginal cost pricing and firms mixing between
not advertising a high fixed fee, and advertising a stochastic lower fixed fee. While there
is little empirical analysis available, our predictions are consistent with several anecdotal
examples and some wider forms of evidence.23
share a common upper utility bound is for x∗i → 1 and x∗j → 0. This limit equilibrium converges to the
equilibrium of a model that allows for A = 0 explicitly without our tie-break rule. See Appendix C1 for
full details.
23In practice, the use of such tariffs may also be driven by heterogeneous consumer preferences. However,
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Second, it characterizes sales when firms hold prices constant but compete with some
non-price variable. This setting covers a broad set of commonly observed marketing
practices, including i) temporary extensions to package size or quantity, such as ‘X% Free’
offers and ‘bonus packs’, ii) temporary increases in product quality or content, such as
the inclusion of free items or ‘premiums’, and iii) other temporary increases in product
value, such as the use of consumer finance deals, prize draws, or charity donations (see the
discussions in Chen et al. (2012), Palazon and Delgado-Ballester (2009)). As consistent
with these phenomena, we show that equilibrium sales will involve firms mixing between
not advertising a minimum ‘regular’ package size/product value, and advertising a sale
with an increased package size/product value.
3.4 n > 2 Firms
We now extend the analysis beyond the simpler case of duopoly to offer new results
about the number and type of firms that use sales in markets with n > 2 firms. Here,
the sales literature with heterogeneous firms is scant because existing models quickly
become intractable. Most notably, as part of their analysis, Baye et al. (1992, Lemmas
7’-14’) establish that only two firms can ever engage in sales behavior in a unit-demand
clearinghouse model with zero advertising costs when firms differ in their shares of non-
shoppers. The remaining firms with relatively larger shares of non-shoppers are less willing
to compete and prefer to always set high (non-sale) prices to their non-shoppers. This
finding has been extended to allow firms to vary in their product values (Kocas and Kiyak
(2006)) or costs (Shelegia (2012)).
However, this ‘two-firm’ prediction contrasts to common empirical findings where mul-
tiple heterogeneous sellers exhibit sales behavior (e.g. Lach (2002), Lewis (2008), Chandra
and Tappata (2011)). Instead, within our more general framework, we now demonstrate
how any number of heterogeneous firms, k∗ ∈ [2, n], can engage in equilibrium sales. In
particular, we explain the factors that determine the number of firms that use sales in
equilibrium, and provide a broad characterization of the types of firms that are likely to
use sales, depending on their advertising costs, non-shopper shares, and profit functions.
To proceed, we use (4) to index the firms in (weakly) decreasing order of u˜i from 1
to n, such that firm n is the least willing to advertise high utilities. We then focus on
consistent with our predictions, most UK suppliers of broadband, land-line and TV packages, as well as
many gym facilities and sports clubs offer sales with reduced monthly fees but unchanged prices for charged
services. Our predictions are also consistent with a finding in Giulietti et al. (2014) which suggests that
firms play mixed strategies with the implied ‘final bill’ for an average consumer in the British electricity
market where suppliers often employ two-part tariffs.
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characterizing sales equilibria in two settings: i) a quasi-symmetric setting where um <
u˜i = u˜ for all i, and ii) a strict asymmetric setting where u
m < u˜n < ... < u˜1.
24
Unlike the duopoly case, the tie-break probabilities can now generate potential sources
of sales equilibrium multiplicity. This can arise for two reasons. First, sales equilibria are
now possible where at least one firm does not advertise. Here, Lemma 5 is insufficient to
pin down a unique equilibrium value of x∗i for firms that never advertise, αi = 0. Second,
equilibrium multiplicity can also exist at knife-edge cases where u˜i = u¯ for some firm i.
Here, Lemma 5 implies that x∗i = 0 such that firm i is indifferent between using sales or
not. To avoid both of these ambiguities which are largely uninteresting from an economic
perspective, we focus on sales equilibria where i) firms that never advertise receive a zero
equilibrium tie-break probability, x∗i = 0 if αi = 0, and ii) advertising firms receive a
positive equilibrium tie-break probability, x∗i > 0 if αi > 0. Lemma 7 now provides a
preliminary step, before Proposition 2 summarizes our main equilibrium result.
Lemma 7. Consider any sales equilibrium that satisfies our restrictions with a given upper
utility bound, u¯ > um. Firm i uses sales if and only if u˜i > u¯. Hence, i) if k
∗ = n then
u¯ ∈ (um, u˜n), and ii) if k∗ ∈ [2, n) then u¯ ∈ [u˜k∗+1, u˜k∗) and K∗ = {1, ..., k∗}.
The basic intuition is straightforward - firm i will only be willing to engage in sales
within a given sales equilibrium if the upper bound, u¯, is lower than the maximum utility
that firm i could possibly wish to advertise, u˜i, from (4). From this logic, Lemma 7 then
goes on to make two immediate statements about the number and identity of firms that
will use sales for a given u¯. If all firms use sales, k∗ = n, then it must be that the upper
bound is sufficiently low such that firm n is willing to use sales, u˜n > u¯. Alternatively, if
only k∗ ∈ [2, n) firms use sales, then the firms using sales must be those with the highest
values of u˜i, K
∗ = {1, ..., k∗}. In particular, it must be that u¯ ∈ [u˜k∗+1, u˜k∗) such that
u¯ < u˜i for i ∈ K∗ = {1, ..., k∗}, but u¯ ≥ u˜j for the remaining firms j = {k∗ + 1, ..., n}.
By using this together with an approach similar to Section 3.3, we now characterize a
unique sales equilibrium under the assumption that a sales equilibrium exists.25 To avoid
undue repetition of technical details, Proposition 2 jumps to the main result (see the proof
for full details).
24A third setting where a subset of firms have the same u˜ but where some remaining firms differ in u˜
can also be analyzed but is omitted for brevity due to its unnecessary complications.
25While Proposition 2 demonstrates equilibrium uniqueness, we are unable to prove existence for the
general case when n > 2 as it is difficult to verify that F ′i (u) > 0 over the relevant u for all i ∈ K∗.
However, existence can be guaranteed by further specifying the model, e.g. if the firms i) are sufficiently
symmetric, ii) differ only in their advertising costs, or iii) differ only in their profit functions when
pii(u) = tipi(u) where ti > 0. An explicit asymmetric example is provided in Section 3.4.1.
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Proposition 2. When a sales equilibrium exists under our restrictions, it is unique. In
such an equilibrium, firms i ≤ k∗ engage in sales with interior probabilities, αi ∈ (0, 1),
while any remaining firms, j > k∗, never advertise αj = 0; k∗, x∗, and u¯ are uniquely
defined as follows:
k∗ =
n if
∑n
i=1 χi(u˜n) < 1 <
∑n
i=1 χi(u
m)
k ∈ [2, n) if ∑ki=1 χi(u˜k) < 1 ≤∑ki=1 χi(u˜k+1) (9)
x∗i =
χi(u¯) ∈ (0, 1) if i ≤ k
∗
0 if i > k∗
(10)
k∗∑
i=1
χi(u¯) = 1 (11)
Before discussing the economic intuition and implications of Proposition 2, it is useful
to provide a sketch of the technical proof. First, for a given k∗ ∈ [2, n], we derive the unique
set of equilibrium tie-breaking probabilities, x∗ in (10), and the unique upper bound, u¯ in
(11). As the non-advertising firms have x∗i = 0 by assumption, the values of x
∗
i ∈ (0, 1) for
the advertising firms follow from Lemma 5 and must sum to one. Second, using Lemma 7,
we then specify the conditions for the equilibrium upper bound, u¯, to be consistent with
the stated number of advertising firms, k∗. In particular, for a given k∗, we require (9) to
ensure that u¯ ∈ (um, u˜n) if k∗ = n , and u¯ ∈ [u˜k∗+1, u˜k∗) if k∗ ∈ [2, n). Third, we show
that (9) always specifies a unique equilibrium value of k∗ ∈ [2, n] provided advertising
costs are sufficiently low:
∑n
i=1 χi(u
m) > 1 or equivalently,
∑n
i=1
Ai
pimi
< (n − 1)(1 − θ).26
Finally, given k∗, the proof derives the unique advertising probabilities, αi ∈ (0, 1), utility
distributions, Fi(u), and profits, Π¯i.
To examine the economic intuition of Proposition 2, Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 now
further discuss the number and type of firms that use equilibrium sales, in turn.
3.4.1 The Number of Firms that Use Sales
First, consider the quasi-symmetric case, where u˜i = u˜ > u
m for all i. Here, from (4),
χi(u˜) = 0 for all i, and so the conditions in (9) can never be satisfied for k
∗ ∈ [2, n).
26In contrast, if
∑n
i=1 χi(u
m) ≤ 1, then there is no solution for k∗ ∈ [2, n]. Instead, in parallel to the
duopoly case, there is a non-sales equilibrium with k∗ = 0 for appropriate values of x∗.
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Instead, any sales equilibrium must have k∗ = n. If two firms wish to use sales, then they
all wish to use sales. This equilibrium then resembles that under duopoly; all firms engage
in sales on (um, u¯], and the unique set of equilibrium tie-breaking probabilities, x∗, ensures
that each firm has an identical incentive to adopt the common upper bound. However, the
resulting tie-break probabilities, utility distributions, and advertising probabilities, need
not be symmetric in equilibrium - they are only symmetric if the firms also have identical
advertising costs, non-shopper shares, and profit functions. Equilibrium existence can be
further demonstrated with F ′i (u) > 0 ∀i over the relevant range if the firms are sufficiently
symmetric.
Now consider the strict asymmetric setting, where um < u˜n < ... < u˜1. Here, the
intuition regarding k∗ is more complex. However, some broad insights can be gained by
simplifying to symmetric advertising costs, Ai = A ∀i, where any changes in A do not
affect the ranking of firms in terms of u˜i.
Corollary 1. Suppose firms are strictly asymmetric, um < u˜n < ... < u˜1, but advertising
costs are symmetric, Ai = A ∀i. When a sales equilibrium exists, i) only two firms use
sales when advertising costs are sufficiently small, k∗ = 2 when A → 0, but ii) all firms
use sales when advertising costs are moderate, k∗ = n when A→ (n−1)(1−θ)∑
i 1/pi
m
i
.
When A → 0, our findings are in line with the existing literature’s two-firm result
and generalize it to a broad range of market settings. When A → 0, competition for the
shoppers is fierce. Hence, the only way for any firms to have exactly the same incentives to
employ a common upper bound is to give the firm with the highest incentive to advertise,
firm 1, almost all the shoppers in a tie, x∗1 → 1. In equilibrium, only firms 1 and 2 then
use sales with u¯ = u˜2.
However, once we allow for higher advertising costs, the two-firm result becomes a
special case of a new and more general relationship. Indeed, from (9), any number of het-
erogeneous firms k∗ ∈ [2, n] may now use sales in equilibrium. At the extreme, Corollary
1 states that all firms can use sales provided advertising costs are moderate. This appears
paradoxical at first because an increase in A reduces the direct incentives for each firm to
use sales, as evidenced by the associated reduction in u˜i. However, the increase in A also
softens the competition for the shoppers and reduces u¯ in a way that prompts firms with
lower u˜i to start using sales. Indeed, for moderate A, u¯ can fall below u˜n such that all
firms use sales. Thus, if the costs of informative advertising fall in the digital era, then
Corollary 1 suggests that fewer firms might opt to use sales.
To conclude this subsection, we provide the following example. Assume unit demand
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such that pii(u) = Ψi − u and pimi = Ψi > 0, where Ψi = Vi − ci denotes the value-cost
markup. Suppose n = 3 and let the firms be symmetric aside from Ψ1 > Ψ2 > Ψ3 > 0
such that um < u˜3 < u˜2 < u˜1. The conditions in (9) then imply that k
∗ = 2 if A ≤ A,
and k∗ = 3 if A ∈ (A, A¯).27 Firm 1 has the largest equilibrium tie-breaking probability,
but it still advertises with the highest probability and offers the highest average utility
offers. Equilibrium existence can be demonstrated with F ′i (u) > 0 over the relevant range
∀i ≤ k∗ provided the firms are not too asymmetric.28
3.4.2 The Types of Firms that Use Sales
To further explore the intuition of Proposition 2, we now consider its implications for the
types of firms that are most likely to use sales. The existing literature only considers some
specific dimensions under unit demand and zero advertising costs (e.g. Baye et al. (1992),
Kocas and Kiyak (2006), Shelegia (2012)). However, in our general setting, we can offer a
broad characterization. In particular, when k∗ < n, Proposition 2 implies that the firms
using sales will be the firms with the highest values of u˜i in (4). Corollary 2 then follows
immediately and generally because u˜i is strictly decreasing in Ai and θi.
Corollary 2. Suppose a sales equilibrium exists with k∗ < n. Ceteris paribus, the firms
with the lowest advertising costs, Ai, and shares of non-shoppers, θi, will use sales.
However, understanding how a firm’s profit function, pii(u), will impact its use of sales
is more difficult because variations in profit functions may affect firms’ profits differently
at different utility levels. To proceed, we focus on the following functional form, pii(u) =
pi(u, ρi), where pi(·) is common across firms, and ρi > 0 is a parameter representing firm i’s
profitability. We assume that pi(u, ρi) is twice continuously differentiable and increasing
in ρi for all u ≥ um, where um maximizes pi(u, ρi) for any ρi.
Corollary 3. Suppose a sales equilibrium exists with k∗ < n, and that firms have sym-
metric shares of non-shoppers, θi = (θ/n) ∀i. Ceteris paribus, the firms that use sales
will be those with the highest profitability, ρi, if increases in ρi raise per-consumer profits
relatively more at higher rather than lower utility levels, piρu(u, ρ) ≥ 0 ∀u > um.
Corollary 3 suggests that the effects of a firm’s profitability, ρi, on its use of sales are
ambiguous. However, it predicts that more profitable firms are more likely to use sales
27In particular, A ≡ (1− θ)√(Ψ1 −Ψ3)(Ψ2 −Ψ3) and A¯ = 2(1− θ)[ 1Ψ1 + 1Ψ2 + 1Ψ3 ]−1.
28Specifically, existence can be demonstrated for 1Ψ1 +
1
Ψ2
> 1Ψ3 . This condition also ensures that A < A¯
and that Assumption A is satisfied for all A < A¯.
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if piρu(u, ρ) ≥ 0 ∀u > um. This condition is satisfied for several common situations. For
instance, it applies under unit demand or two-part tariffs, where ρi captures an increase
in per-consumer demand or a reduction in marginal cost, and where piρu(·) = 0 as piρ(u, ρ)
is independent of u. Thus, in these instances, firms with larger per-consumer demand or
lower marginal costs should be more likely to use sales. Alternatively, it also applies under
downward sloping demand.29
4 Applications
Although our main contribution is methodological, this section provides three applications
to illustrate how our framework can be used to help future research. Section 4.1 examines
a common procedure used in empirical work on sales and price dispersion. Section 4.2
considers a family of games where firms engage in a prior activity to influence their share of
non-shoppers, and Section 4.3 presents a number of comparative statics to further analyze
the effects of firm heterogeneities on sales.
4.1 Implications for Empirical Procedures
Within a given market, price dispersion is broadly divided into two forms. The first
‘temporal’ form involves price differences that vary over time, such as those generated by
sales. The second ‘spatial’ form arises from persistent inter-firm heterogeneities related
to firms’ characteristics. As listed in the introduction, many studies within the large
empirical literature on sales attempt to focus on the temporal form by using a ‘cleaning’
procedure. This procedure retrieves a set of price residuals from raw price data by using
a regression involving observable firm characteristics or firm-level fixed effects. The price
residuals are then interpreted as resulting from a homogeneous symmetric market and used
to perform a reduced-form analysis or structural estimation. We now use our framework
to better understand when this procedure is valid, and to suggest some modifications for
it to be applied more widely.
Wildenbeest (2011) provides the only formal justification for the cleaning procedure
under a specific set of market conditions. A version of his arguments can be derived
in our framework, where in contrast, we generalize to positive advertising costs. Under
unit demand and single products, suppose that firms vary in product quality and costs
29Under downward-sloping demand with a minimum utility constraint, umin ≥ min{umi , ..., umn }, ρi is
best interpreted as a (sufficiently small) reduction in firm i’s marginal cost. There, piρu(·) > 0, because a
reduction in marginal cost profitably extends over a larger number of units for higher u.
21
subject to a common value-cost markup, Vi − ci = Ψ ∀i. This implies symmetric profit
functions, pii(u) = Ψ−u ∀i. Hence, if firms also have symmetric shares of non-shoppers and
advertising costs, then any sales equilibrium will involve symmetric utility distributions,
Fi(u) = F (u) ∀i. Importantly, firms’ subsequent price distributions are then simple
translations of each other as pi(ui) = Vi−ui under unit demand. Therefore, after observing
a panel of price observations, one can obtain a measure of firms’ utility offers (under the
assumption of a stationary, finitely repeated game). Specifically, one can regress the raw
price data on a set of firm-level fixed effects, pit = α + δi + εit, to soak up the effects of
the firm heterogeneities and return a set of ‘cleaned’ residuals that correctly proxy the
utilities up to a positive constant.30
Downward-Sloping Demand: For the procedure to be valid under downward-sloping de-
mand, one first needs a revised condition to ensure that firms’ profit functions are sym-
metric. While a more general condition can be provided, it is sufficient for our purposes
to focus on the following simple case where each firm i has a marginal cost ci ≥ 0, and
a linear per-consumer demand function that varies only in its intercept, qi(pi) = ai − bpi
where ai ≥ 0 and b > 0. From footnote 12, we know ui = (ai − bpi)2/2b and pii(u) =
1
b
[ai − bci −
√
2bu][
√
2bu]. Hence, profit functions are symmetric if ai − bci = Ψ ∀i. This
restriction maintains some sense of Wildenbeest’s constant value-cost assumption. Under
this new condition, one would then aim to recover the firms’ utility draws from the raw
price data. However, unlike unit demand, the relationship between prices and utilities
is non-linear, ui = (ai − bpi)2/2b. Therefore, the cleaning procedure no longer provides
correct estimates of utility up to a positive constant.31 Instead, to recover the utility
draws, one would have to use a more complex, data-intensive procedure to estimate some
of the demand parameters.
Asymmetric Utility Distributions: We now return to unit demand but depart from Wilden-
beest’s constant value-cost condition. Here, firms’ utility distributions will be asymmetric,
Fi(u) 6= F (u), with different mean utilities, uavei , and so firms’ price distributions are no
longer simple translations of each other. Hence, any fixed-effects regression cannot cor-
rectly proxy utilities up to a positive constant. Instead, one could use the following
modification. Rather than using fixed-effects, each firm’s utilities, ui = Vi − pi, could
be estimated more directly from the price data by inferring Vi. As firms will set their
30The estimated residuals equal εˆit ≡ pit− pavei where pavei is the average price of firm i. We also know
that pit = Vi − uit and pavei = Vi − uave, where uave is the average utility from the symmetric utility
distribution. Hence, εˆit ≡ −(uit − uave). For many applications, such as the estimation of search costs,
this is sufficient as only the difference in utilities matters.
31Specifically, pit = (ai/b)−
√
(2uit/b) with residuals, εˆit = pit − pavei ≡ −[
√
(2uit/b)−
√
(2uave/b)].
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highest price equal to Vi with probability (1 − αi) > 0, Vi can be inferred from firm i’s
maximum observed price, or by establishing its ‘regular’ price using a statistical procedure
(e.g. Hosken and Reiffen (2004)). Having recovered the utilities, one could then use our
framework to analyze the observed price dispersion or estimate a structural model. For
instance, by using our theoretical predictions, one could use data on prices and advertis-
ing frequencies to estimate each firm’s share of non-shoppers, θi, marginal cost, ci, and/or
advertising cost, Ai.
4.2 Investment and Obfuscation Games
We now illustrate how our framework’s capacity to allow for asymmetries can also help
develop wider theoretical results. Specifically, we provide some results for a family of
games where each firm’s share of non-shoppers is determined endogenously as a function
of the firms’ actions prior to sales competition. Such actions can be interpreted as any
(long-run) marketing activity that influences consumer loyalty, such as i) investments
in persuasive advertising or sales-force methods, or ii) some forms of obfuscation that
influence the level of complexity or search costs within the market.
Starting with Chioveanu (2008), Carlin (2009) and Wilson (2010) some related streams
of literature have become popular in recent years (see Grubb (2015) and Spiegler (2015) for
a review, and some wider related models). However, as explained in the introduction, only
Baye and Morgan (2009) allow for positive costs of informative advertising, A > 0; yet,
due to the consequent difficulties of analyzing asymmetries, they only show the existence
of a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria and a unique symmetric equilibrium in secure
strategies. In contrast, by utilizing the flexibility of our framework, we can characterize
the unique symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) across a general market
setting (when it exists). Moreover, while their equilibria imply that an increase in the cost
of informative advertising can have a positive, negative or zero effect on the prior actions,
we offer a unique, empirically testable prediction.
To begin, consider a market with n ≥ 2 otherwise symmetric firms. In Stage 1,
each firm i chooses its level of action, ei ≥ 0, with an associated unit cost equal to
τ ≥ 0. Each firm i’s share of non-shoppers, θi(ei, e−i) ∈ (0, 1), is determined by its own
action, ei, and the actions of its rivals, given by the vector e−i. Furthermore, we assume
θi(e, e−i) = θj(e, e−j), ∀i, j, whenever e−j is obtained from e−i by permutation. Then,
in Stage 2, having observed the resulting shares, {θ1(·), ..., θn(·)}, the firms compete in
utility with informative advertising costs, A > 0, in line with our main model and under
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our previously stated conditions.
The exact form of the function, θi(ei, e−i), is allowed to depend upon the type of action.
For instance, under ‘(own) loyalty-increasing actions’, θi(ei, e−i) is strictly increasing in
firm i’s action, ei, and (weakly) decreasing in a rival’s action, ej 6=i, as consistent with
persuasive advertising. Alternatively, under ‘(own) loyalty-decreasing actions’, θi(ei, e−i)
is strictly decreasing in ei and (weakly) increasing in ej 6=i, as consistent with some forms of
obfuscation. However, in either case, we assume that the total proportion of non-shoppers,
θ(·) = ∑ni=1 θi(·), is increasing and concave in any firm’s action, ei, with θ(·) → 1 as∑n
i=1 ei(·)→∞.32
We now seek to characterize the SPNE of the two-stage game. In particular, we wish
to characterize a symmetric SPNE where the firms select positive actions before actively
competing in a sales equilibrium (with ei = e > 0 and αi = α > 0 ∀i). To proceed, note
that firm i will select its action, ei, to maximize its equilibrium profits (net of any direct
action costs), Π¯i = θi(·)pim + x
∗
i
1−x∗i A− τei. However, for our current purposes, it is better
to use an alternative expression based on the expected profits from advertising the upper
utility bound and attracting all the shoppers, Π¯i = pi(u¯(·))[1−
∑
j 6=i θj(·)]−A−τei, where
u¯(·) is now a function of the firms’ actions. We can then state the following.33
Proposition 3. i) When a symmetric SPNE exists with ei = e
∗ > 0 and αi = α∗ > 0 ∀i,
the unique level of action, e∗, satisfies the following FOC:
−pi(u¯(·))(n− 1)∂θj(·)
∂ei
+
(
1− (n− 1)
n
θ(·)
)
pi′(u¯(·))∂u¯(·)
∂ei
− τ = 0 (12)
ii) When actions are own loyalty-increasing (or decreasing), each firm’s equilibrium
action, e∗, is strictly increasing (decreasing) in the costs of informative advertising, A.
Aside from increasing firm i’s total action costs by τ, the FOC in (12) suggests that
a marginal increase in ei generates two effects on the profits of firm i. The first effect
changes the sum of available consumers that firm i can attract with a given offer of u¯
by influencing its (n − 1) rivals’ shares of non-shoppers. Under own loyalty-increasing
32Hence, under a persuasive advertising interpretation, an increase in ei expands the total proportion
of persuaded (non-shopper) consumers, θ(·), as well as increasing firm i’s proportion of non-shoppers,
θi(·). Under the obfuscation interpretation, an increase in ei reduces firm i’s proportion of non-shoppers,
θi(·). However, the increase in ei also makes the firms harder to compare and so it also increases the total
proportion of non-shoppers, θ(·).
33While Proposition 3 demonstrates uniqueness, equilibrium existence remains difficult to verify in the
general case. However, it is clear that the costs of informative advertising, A, must be moderate. If A is
sufficiently small, no symmetric equilibrium exists because firm i’s stage 2 profits exhibit a saddle point
in ei. This mirrors the existing literature with A = 0, e.g. Chioveanu (2008). However, if A is too large,
then no sales equilibrium will exist.
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actions, this effect is (weakly) positive by reducing rivals’ non-shoppers, but under own
loyalty-decreasing actions, the effect is (weakly) negative. In contrast, the second effect
is always positive for either form of action. For a given sum of available consumers, it
increases firm i’s profits per-consumer. Specifically, an increase in ei softens competition
by raising the total proportion of non-shoppers, θ(·), which prompts a reduction in the
equilibrium value of u¯, such that pi′(u¯) ∂u¯
∂ei
> 0.
Now consider the comparative statics. An increase in the costs of informative adver-
tising, A, enhances both of the main effects in (12). Within the first effect, an increase in
A lowers u¯ by reducing the firms’ incentives to use advertised sales. This enhances firm
i’s reward from attracting available consumers, pi(u¯). Thus, to reduce rival non-shopper
shares, firm i will wish to select a higher action under own loyalty-increasing investment,
and a lower action under own loyalty-decreasing investment. Within the second effect,
an increase in A always enhances the incentives for firm i to select a higher action by
increasing the ability of actions to soften competition; a higher A makes u¯ more sensitive
to ei.
Thus, under own loyalty-increasing actions both positive effects become larger, and
so increases in the costs of informative advertising prompt higher equilibrium actions,
∂e/∂A > 0. Hence, reductions in the costs of informative advertising may be beneficial to
markets for two reasons: a direct effect in increasing sales competition, but also an indirect
effect in reducing brand loyalty and thereby further reducing prices. To our knowledge,
this result offers the first theoretical prediction about how the costs of informative adver-
tising affect equilibrium levels of loyalty-enhancing marketing activities such as persuasive
advertising. It remains untested empirically.
Under own loyalty-decreasing actions, increases in A prompt the first effect to become
more negative and the second effect to become more positive. However, the first effect
dominates such that increases in A lower equilibrium actions, ∂e/∂A < 0. Hence, under an
obfuscation interpretation, our model predicts that obfuscation should increase in response
to reductions in informative advertising costs. This complements several theories that
explain how firms’ obfuscation levels should rise after a fall in search costs due to advances
in search technologies (e.g. Ellison and Ellison (2009), Ellison and Wolitzky (2012)).
4.3 Comparative Statics
This sub-section provides some new comparative static results. For symmetric market
cases, the findings extend standard clearinghouse results to a generalized market setting.
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More substantially, for asymmetric market cases where the existing literature has offered
limited results, we offer several new insights by isolating the effects of individual firm
characteristics on sales and market performance. In line with footnote 8, these predictions
remain untested empirically, as the empirical literature has focused on other issues. For
simplicity, we derive the statics under duopoly. However, related results can also be
derived for n > 2.
4.3.1 Changes in a Firm’s Share of Non-Shoppers
Under symmetry, our framework produces a generalized form of the standard clearinghouse
result - an increase in the proportion of non-shoppers, θ, (and associated reduction in
shoppers, 1 − θ) leads to a lower sales probability, α, higher equilibrium profits, Π¯, and
lower average offers, E(u). More interestingly, we can analyze a change in an individual
firm’s share of non-shoppers, θi. As these effects are difficult to characterize, we focus on
evaluating a small increase in θi at the point of symmetry. To proceed, one must also
stipulate whether the increase is associated with a reduction in shoppers, 1− (θi + θj), or
rival non-shoppers, θj = θ − θi. We first consider the latter:
Proposition 4. In an otherwise symmetric market, consider a small increase in firm
i’s non-shoppers θi (and associated reduction in θj). Starting from a point of symmetry,
θi = θj, this increases firm i’s equilibrium profits, Π¯i, decreases firm i’s sales probability,
αi, and average offer, E(ui), and generates the opposite effects on firm j.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in θi reduces u˜i and makes firm i less willing to offer higher
utilities. However, to maintain the firms’ incentives to employ a common u¯ in equilibrium,
this is partially offset by a reduction in firm i’s equilibrium tie-break probability, x∗i (and
an associated increase in x∗j). Hence, when combined, these effects lead firm i (firm j) to
gain higher (lower) equilibrium profits, use sales with a lower (higher) probability, and set
lower (higher) average utility offers. While intuitive, the last result about average utility
offers differs from Arnold et al. (2011) which considers asymmetric θi with unit demand
and A > 0 under the past literature’s tie-break rule. Instead, they suggest an increase
in θi leads firm i to become more aggressive in its advertised prices and so offer higher
average utility offers. Unlike our results, this finding conflicts with standard results under
A = 0 such as Narasimhan (1988).34
34With two exceptions, our findings remain robust in the alternative case where the increase in θi comes
from a reduction in shoppers. First, an increase in θi now raises Π¯j because there is no reduction in θj .
Second, an increase in θi can provide reversed effects on αj and E(uj) if advertising costs are relatively
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4.3.2 Changes in a Firm’s Advertising Costs
Under symmetry, one can verify a generalized form of the standard result - an increase
in advertising costs, A, leads to a lower sales probability, α, higher equilibrium profits,
Π¯, and lower average offers, E(u). More substantially, our framework can now isolate the
effects from a change in an individual firm’s advertising cost, Ai.
Proposition 5. In an otherwise symmetric market, a small increase in firm i’s advertising
cost, Ai, leads to no change in firm i’s equilibrium profits, Π¯i, an increase in firm j’s
equilibrium profits, Π¯j, and a decrease in both firms’ sales probabilities and average offers,
αk and E(uk) for k = i, j.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in Ai reduces u˜i and makes firm i less willing to offer higher
utilities. However, to maintain a common u¯, this is also accompanied by a reduction in
firm i’s equilibrium tie-break probability, x∗i , (and associated increase in x
∗
j). This leads to
no aggregate effect on Π¯i because the direct effect from Ai is exactly offset by the indirect
effect from x∗i . However, an increase in Ai raises firm j’s profits, Π¯j, because the indirect
effect raises x∗j . Hence, given our assumptions, the standard profit result under symmetry
is driven by the rise in rival, rather than own, advertising costs. Finally, the increase in
Ai reduces both firms’ use of sales, and prompts a subsequent reduction in their average
offers.
4.3.3 Changes in a Firm’s Profit Function
As previously explained, studying variations in firms’ profit functions is difficult at a
general level. However, we now provide some comparative statics by using the form of
profit function introduced in Section 3.4.2, pi(u, ρ). In particular, we focus on situations
where an increase in firm i’s profitability, ρi, raises firm i’s per-consumer profits relatively
more at higher rather than lower utility levels, piρu(u, ρ) ≥ 0 ∀u > um, which we argued
was consistent with many market environments.
Under symmetry, one can derive a new result; an industry-wide increase in profitability,
ρ, increases firms’ equilibrium profits, while also inducing an increase in the probability of
sales, α, and average utility offers, E(u). In addition, we can also isolate the effects from a
change in an individual firm’s profitability, ρi. The existing literature has only been able
to consider a few specific cases involving individual changes in marginal costs or product
high. This arises due to the opposing effects of a decrease in shoppers, and an increase in x∗j (which varies
in A). However, firm i still offers a lower average utility than firm j.
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values under unit demand and zero advertising costs (e.g. Kocas and Kiyak (2006)).
Related technical difficulties also remain in our framework. However, by evaluating a
small change at the point of symmetry, we can substantially improve upon past results:
Proposition 6. In an otherwise symmetric market, consider a small increase in firm
i’s profitability, ρi. Starting from a point of symmetry, ρi = ρj, this increases firm i’s
equilibrium profits, Π¯i, sales probability, αi, and average offer, E(ui), but decreases firm
j’s equilibrium profits, Π¯j.
An increase in ρi unambiguously increases firm i’s equilibrium profits and overall in-
dustry profits. Further, in the common cases where piρu(u, ρ) ≥ 0, an increase in ρi also
raises firm i’s incentive to advertise higher utilities. This prompts an increase in firm
i’s equilibrium tie-break probability, x∗i , to maintain a common u¯. Nevertheless, firm i
increases it sales probability, αi, and its average offer, E(ui), while firm j receives lower
equilibrium profits, Π¯j.
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5 Conclusions
Due to the associated technical complexities, existing clearinghouse sales models are un-
able to fully consider the effects of firm heterogeneity. This restricts theoretical under-
standing, empirical analysis, and policy guidance with regards to sales and price disper-
sion, and many other topics in related literatures. The current paper has tried to fill this
gap by providing a generalized clearinghouse sales framework. In addition, the paper has
i) provided original insights into the number and types of firms that use sales, ii) offered
new results on how firm heterogeneity affects market outcomes, iii) extended a ‘clean-
ing’ procedure that is commonly used within the empirical literature, and iv) analyzed
a family of games to study persuasive advertising and obfuscation in sales markets. By
opening up the analysis of sales with firm heterogeneity, we hope that our framework
can enable future research to further address many theoretical and empirical issues that
remain under-explored.
35In general, the effects on αj and E(uj) are more nuanced. However, for u¯ sufficiently close to u
m, an
increase in ρi leads both firms to increase their sales probabilities and average offers.
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Appendix A - Example Equilibrium Specifications
This appendix contains a number of equilibrium specifications by further detailing the
exact source of utility and profit function. To help exposition, we illustrate the main
steps within a context of full symmetry. Here, using the results from Sections 3.3 and
3.4, this also permits us to easily include the equilibrium details for n ≥ 2 firms rather
than just duopoly. Section A1 summarizes the basic n-firm equilibrium under full sym-
metry. Sections A2-A4 then detail the equilibrium under unit demand, downward-sloping
demand, and multiple products, while discussing how our framework can reproduce and
substantially extend many of the past literature’s key predictions for pricing, advertising,
and purchasing behavior. Sections A5-A6 demonstrate how Proposition 1 can be used to
characterize some common forms of sales that have remained unstudied within the clear-
inghouse literature, including cases where firms use two-part tariffs or non-price variables
such as package size (e.g ‘X% Free’).
A1. Equilibrium under Full Symmetry
Using the results from Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we can now summarize the basic n-firm
equilibrium under full symmetry. Here, all firms will use sales in equilibrium and the
equilibrium tie-break rule will be fully symmetric, x∗i =
1
n
. In addition, for all i, we
know Π¯i =
θpim
n
+ A
n−1 , αi = 1 −
( n
n−1A
(1−θ)pim
) 1
n−1
, u¯ = pi−1
(
θpim+ n
2
n−1A
θ+n(1−θ)
)
and Fi(u) =(
θ[pim−pi(u)]+ n2
n−1A
n(1−θ)pi(u)
) 1n−1
.
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A2. Equilibrium with Unit Demand
Building on footnote 12, suppose ui = V − pi and pi(ui) = V − c − ui, where umi = 0
and pim = V − c. Under full symmetry, this produces a simple clearinghouse equilibrium
with x∗i =
1
n
, Π¯i =
θ(V−c)
n
+ A
n−1 , αi = 1 −
( n
n−1A
(1−θ)(V−c)
) 1
n−1
, and u¯ =
n(1−θ)(V−c)− n2
n−1A
θ+n(1−θ) .
By using Fi(p) = 1 − Fi(u), one can further derive Fi(p) = 1 −
(
θ(V−p)+ n2
n−1A
n(1−θ)(p−c)
) 1
n−1
with
pm = V − um = V and p = V − u¯. This collapses to the (popularized) equilibrium of
Varian (1980) when A → 0. Under firm heterogeneity, the past literature has considered
various asymmetries in non-shopper shares, product values and/or costs in the duopoly
setting under the restriction, Ai = Aj = 0. As detailed in Appendix C1, our framework
can obtain these equilibria in the limit when Ai = Aj → 0 while allowing for any θi, ci, and
Vi. Moreover, our framework can also extend them to allow for positive and asymmetric
advertising costs.
A3. Equilibrium with Downward-Sloping Demand
Suppose each consumer has a downward-sloping demand function for firm i’s good, qi(pi),
and that firm i has a constant marginal cost, ci ≥ 0. Firm i then has a per-consumer
profit function equal to pii(pi) = (pi − ci)qi(pi), and the utility at firm i can be given by
its associated consumer surplus, ui = S(pi, qi(pi)). Under our sales equilibrium, each firm
i then chooses its price to maximize its profits subject to supplying its required utility
draw, ui, with p
∗
i (ui) = argmaxpi pii(pi) subject to S(pi, qi(pi)) = ui. It also follows that
pmi = argmaxpi pii(pi), with u
m
i = S(p
m
i , qi(p
m
i )) and pi
m
i ≡ pii(umi ) = pii(pmi ).
Under full symmetry, this produces a standard clearinghouse equilibrium (e.g. Baye
et al. (2004a)). Specifically, it follows that x∗i =
1
n
, Π¯i =
θpi(pm)
n
+ A
n−1 , αi = 1 −( n
n−1A
(1−θ)pi(pm)
) 1
n−1
, and u¯ = pi−1
(
θpi(pm)+ n
2
n−1A
θ+n(1−θ)
)
. Using Fi(p) = 1 − Fi(u), one can then
find Fi(p) = 1 −
(
θ[pi(pm)−pi(p)]+ n2
n−1A
n(1−θ)pi(p)
) 1
n−1
with p = p∗(u¯) and p¯ = p∗(um) = pm.36 Our
framework shows how this clearinghouse equilibrium can be generalized to allow for asym-
metric advertising costs, non-shopper shares, and profit functions (provided there is some
binding minimum utility constraint if needed).
36For comparison, standard clearinghouse models express the price distribution conditional on adver-
tising. In our model, this equates to FAi (p) =
1−Fi(u)
αi
.
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A4. Equilibrium with Downward-Sloping Demand and Multiple
Products
An equilibrium with downward-sloping demand where firms sell multiple products can
be derived as an extension of A3 above. In particular, now suppose firm i has Ki ≥ 1
products, where ci = {ci1, ....ciKi}, pi = {pi1, ....piKi} and qi(pi) = {qi1(pi), ....qiKi(pi)}
denote the associated vectors of (constant) marginal costs, prices, and product demand
functions per consumer. Many of the steps from section A3, then apply immediately. In
particular, under suitable demand assumptions, there exists a unique price vector that
maximizes a firm’s profits subject to supplying a given utility draw u across its products,
such that p∗i (u) = argmaxpi pii(pi) = q
∗
i (pi)
′(pi − ci) subject to S(pi,q∗i (p)) = u, with
resulting profits per-consumer, pii(u) ≡ pii(p∗i (u)).37 Under full symmetry, this reproduces
versions the equilibrium of Simester (1997) when marginal costs are zero, K ≥ 1, and
A → 0. More substantially, for any marginal costs and any K, we can permit positive
asymmetric advertising costs, and asymmetric shares of non-shoppers.
A5. Equilibrium with Two-Part Tariffs
In line with the associated discussion in Section 3.3, suppose the firms employ two-
part tariffs to better extract consumer surplus as consistent with a form of oligopolis-
tic first-degree price discrimination. In particular, reconsider the analysis in A3 and A4
above where firm i has Ki ≥ 1 products, downward-sloping demand functions, qi(·),
and marginal costs, ci. However, now let each firm i set a Ki-dimensional vector of
marginal prices (per unit of consumption), pi, and a single fixed fee, fi ≥ 0. It then
follows that pii(pi, fi) = qi(pi)
′(pi−ci) +fi and ui = S(pi,qi(pi))−fi where S(pi,qi(pi))
denotes a consumer’s surplus at i gross of i’s fixed fee. To generate any utility, u′, i
will choose pi and fi to maximize pii(pi, fi) subject to S(pi,qi(pi)) − fi = u′. This
implies marginal cost pricing across each product, pi = ci, together with a suitably ad-
justed fixed fee, fi = S(ci,qi(ci)) − u′. The full equilibrium can then be derived using
pii(u) = S(ci,qi(ci))− u, um = 0 and pii(um) = S(ci,qi(ci)).
37This constrained pricing decision can be thought of as a Ramsey problem. Individual prices are hard
to fully characterize, but with additional restrictions, firms can be shown to optimally use lower prices on
products that are more price-elastic and complementary to other products. See Armstrong and Vickers
(2001) and Simester (1997) for more discussion.
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A6. Equilibrium with Non-Price Sales
For ease of exposition, consider a fully symmetric market with single products and unit
demand. In line with the associated discussion in Section 3.3, suppose each firm’s price
is fixed at p > 0, and that each firm employs some other sales variable zi ∈ [z, z]. To
avoid any unnecessary complications, we make two assumptions to ensure unique corre-
spondences between zi, ui, and pi(ui). First, let both the consumers’ willingness to pay
for i’s product, V (zi), and i’s marginal (per unit) cost, c(zi), be strictly increasing in zi,
such that u(zi) = V (zi) − p is strictly increasing in zi, and pi(zi) = p − c(zi) is strictly
decreasing in zi. Second, let u(z) = V (z) − p ≥ 0 and pi(z) = p − c(z) > 0. Because
profits and utilities are monotone in z, we have z = V −1(p + u). We can then derive
pi(u) = p − c(V −1(p + u)) and um = V (z) − p. To ensure the equilibrium exists, we can
verify that pi(um) = p−c(z) > 0 and pi′(u) < 0. The full equilibrium can then be explicitly
derived and shown to exhibit the features listed in Section 3.3.
Appendices B and C can be found in the online supplementary appendix.
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Online Supplementary Appendix:
Appendix B - Main Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that ui < u
m is always strictly dominated by ui = u
m
for any ηi ∈ {0, 1}. Increasing ui to um would i) raise firm i’s profits per consumer as
pi′i(u) > 0 for ui < u
m, and yet ii) never reduce the number of consumers that it trades
with. Second, ui > u
m is strictly dominated by ui = u
m when ηi = 0. Reducing ui to u
m
would i) strictly increase firm i’s profits per-consumer as pi′i(u) < 0 for ui > u
m, but ii)
never reduce the number of consumers that it trades with, since non-advertised offers are
unobserved to consumers and consumers can only visit one firm. Third, for any tie-break
probability, xi(T ) ∈ [0, 1], setting ui = um and ηi = 1 with positive probability is strictly
dominated by setting ui = u
m and ηi = 0 . Given ui = u
m, moving from advertising to not
advertising would i) strictly reduce firm i’s advertising costs, Ai > 0, and ii) never reduce
the number of consumers that it trades with since xi(T ) is independent of advertising
decisions via Assumption X.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, any sales equilibrium must have k∗ ≥ 2 because there can
be no sales equilibrium with k∗ = 1. If so, firm i would win the shoppers with probability
one whenever advertising as then ui > u
m and uj = u
m ∀j 6= i. Hence, in such instances,
i’s strategy cannot be defined as it would always want to relocate its probability mass
closer to um. Second, given this, one can then adapt standard arguments (e.g. Baye et al.
(1992)), to show that for at least two firms i and j, u must be a point of increase of Fi(u)
and Fj(u) at any u ∈ (um, u¯]. Third, by adapting standard arguments (e.g. Narasimhan
(1988), Baye et al. (1992), Arnold et al. (2011)) firms cannot use point masses on any
u > um. Fourth, any firm with αi > 0 must have αi ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium. To see this,
suppose αi = 1 for some i and note from above that at least two firms must randomize just
above um. If so, the expected profits from advertising just above um must equal θjpi
m
j −Aj
for at least one such firm j 6= i as there can be no mass points at u > um. However, firm
j could earn θjpi
m
j > θjpi
m
j − Aj from not advertising; a contradiction. Finally, suppose
n = 2. As a consequence of previous arguments, in any sales equilibrium both firms must
share a common advertised utility support, (um, u¯], with no gaps.
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Proof of Lemma 3. Assume the opposite and consider the following exhaustive cases.
First, consider a potential tie involving at least one advertising firm and at least one
non-advertising firm. If so, any advertising firms in T must set u > um, and any non-
advertising firms in T must set um in equilibrium; a contradiction. Second, consider a
potential tie involving only advertising firms. For such a tie to arise, at least two firms
must put positive probability mass on some utility level, u > um. However, such mass
points cannot exist in equilibrium via Lemma 2. Third, consider a potential tie involving
only non-advertising firms, but where |T | < n. If so, the firms in T must set um, and any
remaining firm, j /∈ T , must set uj > um in equilibrium, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. Firm i’s expected profits from advertising just above um must
equal pimi [θi + (1 − θ)Πj 6=i(1 − αj)] − Ai, where for a cost of Ai it can win the shoppers
outright with the probability that its rivals set um and do not advertise, Πj 6=i(1 − αj).
If firm i uses sales, we know from the text that its expected profits from advertising an
offer just above um must equal its expected profits from not advertising, (1). Hence, by
equating these two expressions one can solve for
Πj 6=i(1− αj) = Ai
(1− x∗i )(1− θ)pimi
. (13)
The expression in (2) can then be derived by plugging this back in to (1).
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose firm i uses sales in equilibrium and u¯ > um. i) For this
to be optimal, it must be that u¯ ≤ u˜i. Suppose not. Then from the derivation of (4), we
know pii(u¯)(1 − θ−i) − Ai < θipimi such that firm i would strictly prefer to deviate from
ui = u¯. ii) To derive (5), note that (1) expresses Π¯i for a given x
∗
i , and that i must expect
to earn Π¯i for ui = u
m and for all ui ∈ (um, u¯]. If i set ui = u¯ it would attract the shoppers
with probability one because there are no mass points on u ∈ (um, u¯]. Hence, it must be
that Π¯i = (1− θ−i)pii(u¯)− Ai. Solving this implies x∗i = χi(u¯).
Proof of Lemma 6. First, given x∗1 + x
∗
2 = 1 and x
∗
i = χi(u¯), it must be that χ1(u¯) +
χ2(u¯) = 1. χ1(u¯) + χ2(u¯) is defined on u¯ ∈ (um,min{u˜1, u˜2}) and is strictly decreasing.
Hence, we know the solution for u¯ will be unique, if it exists. Second, the expression for αi
can be calculated using (13) from the proof of Lemma 4. There, we found Πj 6=i(1−αj) =
Ai
(1−x∗i )(1−θ)pimi , and so the unique expression (7) follows for n = 2. Third, to derive Fi(u),
we require firm i’s equilibrium profits, Π¯i, to equal its expected profits for all ui ∈ (um, u¯],
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pii(u)[θi + (1 − θ)Fj(u)] − Ai. Using (2) and rearranging for Fj(u) implies the unique
expression (8).
Proof of Proposition 1. Part a). If a sales equilibrium exists, Lemmas 1-6 have char-
acterized its unique properties. We now demonstrate that this sales equilibrium exists
and that no other equilibrium can exist when A1
pim1
+ A2
pim2
< 1− θ.
First, we show that no other equilibrium can exist. The only other candidate is a non-
sales equilibrium where α1 = α2 = 0 and u1 = u2 = u
m. For this to be an equilibrium, we
require that no firm i can profitably deviate to advertising a utility slightly above um to
attract all the shoppers. For a given x∗i , this requires pi
m
i [θi+x
∗
i (1−θ)] ≥ pimi [θi+(1−θ)]−Ai
or Ai
pimi
≥ (1 − θ)(1 − x∗i ). The same condition for j yields Ajpimj ≥ (1 − θ)x
∗
i , and so for
both to hold we need 1 − Ai
(1−θ)pimi ≤ x
∗
i ≤ Aj(1−θ)pimj . However, no such x
∗
i can exist when
A1
pim1
+ A2
pim2
< 1− θ.
Second, we demonstrate the unique sales equilibrium exists. For this, it is sufficient
to show that χ1(u¯) + χ2(u¯) = 1 implies a solution u¯ ∈ (um,min{u˜1, u˜2}). This follows as
χ1(u¯)+χ2(u¯) is i) strictly decreasing in u¯ ∈ (um,min{u˜1, u˜2}), ii) below 1 for u¯ sufficiently
close to min{u˜1, u˜2} and iii) above 1 for u¯ sufficiently close to um when A1pim1 +
A2
pim2
< 1− θ.
It then follows that x∗i = χi(u¯) ∈ (0, 1) for i = {1, 2}. One can then verify that α∗i =
1− Aj
x∗i (1−θ)pimj ∈ (0, 1), Fi(·) is increasing over (u
m, u¯], and Fi(u¯) = 1 for both firms.
Part b). As demonstrated in Part a), a sales equilibrium only exists when A1
pim1
+
A2
pim2
< 1 − θ. However, we now demonstrate that a non-sales equilibrium exists when
A1
pim1
+ A2
pim2
≥ 1− θ. From above, a non-sales equilibrium requires 1− Ai
(1−θ)pimi ≤ x
∗
i ≤ Aj(1−θ)pimj
for each i, or equivalently, x∗i = 1− x∗j ∈ [χi(um), 1− χj(um)]. This interval is non-empty
when A1
pim1
+ A2
pim2
≥ 1− θ.
Proof of Lemma 7. First, let u˜i > u¯. To show why αi > 0 in equilibrium, suppose not,
with αi = 0. From our restrictions, firm i would then have x
∗
i = 0. Thus, by the definition
of u˜i, i would be indifferent between never advertising, and advertising u˜i provided it
attracted all the shoppers. Given u˜i > u¯, i must then strictly prefer to deviate to set
ηi = 1 with ui = u¯ where it could win the shoppers with probability one; a contradiction.
Second, let u˜i ≤ u¯. To show why αi = 0 in equilibrium, suppose not, with αi > 0.
From our restrictions, firm i would then have x∗i > 0. Thus, using the definition of u˜i, i
would be unwilling to advertise over the whole required support u ∈ (um, u¯], and would
strictly prefer to deviate to αi = 0. Finally, statements i) and ii) in the Lemma then follow
immediately given our two settings where um < u˜i = u˜ for all i, or u
m < u˜n < ... < u˜1.
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Proof of Proposition 2. In line with the sketch of the proof under the proposition, we
proceed by proving a number of claims.
Claim 1: In any sales equilibrium under our restrictions, a) the equilibrium tie-break
probabilities, x∗, and upper bound, u¯, are uniquely (implicitly) defined by (10) and (11),
and b) these solutions must satisfy (9) for k∗ to be consistent with equilibrium.
Proof of 1a: We know from (5), that any advertising firm, i ≤ k∗, must have x∗i = χi(u¯).
From Lemma 7, an advertising firm must have u˜i > u¯ such that x
∗
i = χi(u¯) > 0 as required.
In addition, from our restrictions, x∗i = 0 for all non-advertising firms, i > k
∗. Hence, (10)
applies. As
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i must sum to one, it then also follows that u¯ is implicitly defined by
(11). Note
∑k∗
i=1 χi(u¯) is strictly decreasing on u¯ ∈ (um, u˜k∗). Hence, the solution for u¯
will be unique.
Proof of 1b: First, suppose k∗ = n. Then from Lemma 7, we require the solution to
(11) to lie within u¯ ∈ (um, u˜n). Thus, we require
∑n
i=1 χi(u
m) > 1 and
∑n
i=1 χi(u˜n) < 1
as consistent with (9). Note that u¯ ∈ (um, u˜n) also guarantees a unique interior value
for x∗i ∈ (0, 1) ∀i ≤ k∗. Second, suppose k∗ ∈ [2, n). Then from Lemma 7, we require
the solution to (11) to lie within u¯ ∈ [u˜k∗+1, u˜k∗). Thus, we require
∑k∗
i=1 χi(u˜k∗+1) ≥ 1
and
∑k∗
i=1 χi(u˜k∗) < 1 as consistent with (9). Note that u¯ ∈ [u˜k∗+1, u˜k∗) also guarantees a
unique interior value for x∗i ∈ (0, 1) ∀i ≤ k∗ under our restrictions.
Claim 2: Whenever a sales equilibrium exists under our restrictions, k∗ ∈ [2, n] is
uniquely defined by (9) provided 1 <
∑n
i=1 χi(u
m).
Proof: Using Claim 1, it is useful to summarize and re-notate the following results.
First, for any k∗ ∈ [2, n],∑k∗i=1 χi(u¯) is strictly decreasing on u¯ ∈ (um, u˜k∗). Second, using
(9), if k∗ = n, then we require In ≡
∑n
i=1 χi(u˜n) < 1 <
∑n
i=1 χi(u
m) ≡ I¯n. Third, if
k∗ = k ∈ (2, n], then we require Ik ≡
∑k∗
i=1 χi(u˜k∗) < 1 ≤
∑k∗
i=1 χi(u˜k∗+1) ≡ I¯k. Hence,
for k∗ to be uniquely defined, there must exist exactly one value of k∗ for which either
1 ∈ (In, I¯n) or 1 ∈ (Ik, I¯k]. Provided
∑n
i=1 χi(u
m) ≡ I¯n > 1, this then follows because i)
Iz+1 = I¯z for any z ∈ (2, n] (as
∑z+1
i=1 χi(u˜z+1) =
∑z
i=1 χi(u˜z+1) given χz+1(u˜z+1) = 0 from
(4)), and ii) I2 ≡
∑2
i=1 χi(u˜2) < 1 (as
∑2
i=1 χi(u˜2) = χ1(u˜2) ∈ (0, 1)).
Claim 3: Whenever a sales equilibrium exists under our restrictions, the firms’ adver-
tising probabilities and offer distributions are uniquely defined. Firms i > k∗ have αi = 0
and ui = u
m, and firms i ≤ k∗ have:
αi = 1−
[
Πk
∗
j=1γj(u
m))
] 1
k∗−1
γi(um)
∈ (0, 1) (14)
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Fi(u) =
[
Πk
∗
j=1γj(u)
] 1
k∗−1
γi(u)
(15)
where γi(u) =
pii(u¯)(1− θ−i)− θipii(u)
(1− θ)pii(u) (16)
In addition, ∀i, each firm i’s equilibrium profits remain equal to (2).
Proof: The behavior of firms i > k∗ follows immediately from Lemma 1. To derive
(14), first recall (13) from the proof of Lemma 4, Πj 6=i(1− αj) = Ai(1−x∗i )(1−θ)pimi . As αi = 0
for all i > k∗, this also equals Πj 6=i∈K∗(1−αj). After plugging in x∗i = χi(u¯), Πj 6=i∈K∗(1−
αj) = γi(u
m), where γi(u) is given by (16). By then multiplying this equation across
the k∗ firms, we get Πk
∗
i=1[Πj 6=i∈K∗(1 − αj)] ≡ Πk∗i=1(1 − αi)k∗−1 = Πk∗i=1γi(um), such that
Πk
∗
i=1(1 − αi) =
[
Πk
∗
i=1γi(u
m)
] 1
(k∗−1) . Then, by returning to Πj 6=i∈K∗(1 − αj) = γi(um)
and multiplying both sides by 1 − αi we get Πk∗j=1(1 − αj) = (1 − αi)γi(um), which after
substitution provides (14). Similar steps can be then used to derive the unique utility
distributions, (15). One can verify that αi ∈ (0, 1) and Fi(u¯) = 1 ∀i ≤ k∗ as required
given u¯ ∈ (u˜k∗+1, u˜k∗ ]. Finally, to verify each firm’s equilibrium profits, remember that
each firm must earn (1) for a given set of tie-break probabilities. After substituting out
for Πj 6=i(1− αj) from above, this equals (2). Note that (2) applies not only to firms that
use sales, but also to those that do not because they have x∗i = 0 under our assumptions
such that Π¯i = θipi
m
i as consistent with them pricing only to their non-shoppers.
Proof of Corollary 1. i) Let A → 0. Using (3) and past results, ∑k∗i=1 χi(u˜k∗) =∑k∗−1
i=1 χi(u˜k∗) → (k∗ − 1) for any k∗ ∈ [2, n]. Hence, the conditions in (9) can only be
satisfied when k∗ = 2. ii) Let A→ (n−1)(1−θ)∑n
i=1
1
pim
i
. Using (3),
∑n
i=1 χi(u
m) = n− nA
(1−θ)∑ni=1 pimi →
1 such that the solution to u¯ in (11) converges to um < u˜n from above. Hence, it must be
that u¯ ∈ (um, u˜n) as only consistent with k∗ = n.
Proof of Corollary 3. From above, firms with a higher u˜i are more likely to use sales.
Hence, we require ∂u˜i
∂ρi
> 0. Rewrite (4) as (1− θ−i)pi(u˜i, ρi)−Ai = θipi(um, ρi). Then note
that ∂u˜i
∂ρi
= θipiρ(u
m,ρi)−(1−θ−i)piρ(u˜i,ρi)
(1−θ−i)piu(u˜i,ρi) . As piu(u˜i, ρi) < 0 given u˜i > u
m, then ∂u˜i
∂ρi
is positive
whenever 1−θ−i
θi
> piρ(u
m,ρi)
piρ(u˜i,ρi)
. This is satisfied when θi = (θ/n) ∀i and piρu ≥ 0 for u > um
because i) 1−θ−i
θi
= n−(n−1)θ
θ
> 1 given θ ∈ (0, 1), and ii) piρ(um,ρi)
piρ(u˜i,ρi)
≤ 1 given u˜i > um.
Proof of Proposition 3. i) Given Π¯i = pi(u¯(·))(1 −
∑
j 6=i θj(·)) − A − τei, firm i’s
first-order condition wrt ei can be expressed by (12) when evaluated at symmetry with
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θj(·) = θ(·)/n ∀j. ii) For the comparative statics, we first re-write the FOC in terms of
model primitives by using (11) to derive ∂u¯(·)
∂ei
. When evaluated at symmetry, this equals
[pim+pi(u¯(·))(n−1)]
pi′(u¯(·))[n−(n−1)θ(·)]
(
∂θi(·)
∂ei
− (n− 1)∂θj(·)
∂ei
)
where pi(u¯(·)) = θ(·)pi
m+ An
2
(n−1)
n−(n−1)θ(·) . By substituting these
in and rearranging, one can rewrite the FOC as: ∂θi(·)
∂ei
(pim +An) +
∂θj(·)
∂ei
[pim(1− θ(·))(n−
1) − An] − τ [n − θ(·)(n − 1)] = 0. We now denote the LHS of this equation as H(·)
and apply the implicit function theorem. At any symmetric equilibrium, the associated
second-order condition must be negative, such that ∂H(·)
∂ei
≡ ∂2Π¯i
∂e2i
< 0. Hence, it follows
that ∂e
∂A
R 0 if ∂H(·)
∂A
= n
(∂θi(·)
∂ei
− ∂θj(·)
∂ei
)
R 0. Hence, given our assumptions about the form
of θi(·), the statics follow as ∂H(·)∂A > 0 under own loyalty-increasing actions, but ∂H(·)∂A < 0
under own loyalty-decreasing actions.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let pii(u) = pi(u), Ai = A and θj = θ − θi. From (6), ∂u¯∂θi = 0
after we impose symmetry ex post with θi = θj = θ/2. By using this with the derivative
of (5), we gain
∂x∗i
∂θi
= − A[pim−pi(u¯)]
[pi(u¯)(1−(θ/2))−(θ/2)pim]2 < 0. These two results also help us find the
remaining derivatives. Using (2) or Π¯i = (1 − θj)pii(u¯) − Ai gives ∂Π¯i∂θi = pi(u¯) > 0 and
∂Π¯j
∂θi
= −pi(u¯) < 0, and using (7) gives ∂αi
∂θi
= − [pim−pi(u¯)]
(1−θ)pim < 0, and
∂αj
∂θi
= pi
m−pi(u¯)
(1−θ)pim > 0.
Further, from (8), ∂Fi
∂θi
= pi(u)−pi(u¯)
(1−θ)pi(u) > 0 and
∂Fj
∂θi
= −pi(u)−pi(u¯)
(1−θ)pi(u) < 0 for all relevant u, such
that E(ui) decreases and E(uj) increases.
Proof of Proposition 5. Given pii(u) = pi(u) and θi = θ/2, note from (5) and (6) that
Ai+Aj = pi(u¯)(1− θ2)− θ2pim = Ajxi , such that x∗i =
Aj
Ai+Aj
. For the profit results, substitute
x∗i into (2) to give Π¯i =
θ
2
pim + Aj. For the remaining results, substitute x
∗
i into (7) to
give αi = 1− Ai+Aj(1−θ)pim , and into (8) to obtain Fi(u) = (θ/2)[pi
m−pi(u)]+[Ai+Aj ]
(1−θ)pi(u) . An increase in
Ai then decreases αi and αj, and increases Fi(u) and Fj(u) for all relevant u.
Proof of Proposition 6. Given Ai = A and θi = θ/2, note from (6) that
∂u¯
∂ρi
|ρi=ρj=ρ =
(1−(θ/2))piρ(u¯,ρ)−(θ/2)piρ(um,ρ)
−(2−θ)piu(u¯,ρ) . This is positive as both the denominator and numerator are
positive given θ ∈ (0, 1), piρu(·) ≥ 0 and u¯ > um. Then, using (5) and the above, ∂x
∗
i
∂ρi
=
A[(2−θ)piρ(u¯,ρ)−θpiρ(um,ρ)]
[(2−θ)pi(u¯,ρ)−θpi(um,ρ)]2 , which has the same sign as
∂u¯
∂ρi
|ρi=ρj=ρ. Note Π¯i = (1− θ2)pi(u¯, ρi)−A.
At the point of symmetry, it then follows that ∂Π¯i
∂ρi
= (1− θ
2
)
(
piρ(u¯, ρ) +
∂u¯
∂ρi
piu(u¯, ρ)
)
which
equals 1
2
[(1−(θ/2))piρ(u¯, ρ)+(θ/2)piρ(um, ρ)] > 0. Similarly, note Π¯j = (1− θ2)pi(u¯, ρj)−A.
Then
∂Π¯j
∂ρi
= 1
2
θpiρ(u
m, ρ) which has the opposite sign of ∂u¯
∂ρi
|ρi=ρj=ρ. Using (7), one can
then prove ∂αi
∂ρi
has the same sign as ∂u¯
∂ρi
|ρi=ρj=ρ. Using (8) one can show that ∂Fi(u)∂ρi has
the opposite sign to ∂u¯
∂ρi
|ρi=ρj=ρ for all relevant u.
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Appendix C - Supplementary Equilibrium Details
Sections C1 and C2 provide extra information about the equilibrium when i) advertising
costs tend to zero, and ii) the single visit assumption is relaxed.
C1. Equilibrium when Advertising Costs Tend to Zero
To ease exposition and to best connect to the existing literature, we illustrate the case of
near-zero advertising costs for the duopoly equilibrium. Suppose the firms are asymmetric,
but A1 = A2 = A→ 0. The equilibrium depends upon u˜1 ≷ u˜2. Without loss of generality,
suppose u˜i < u˜j such that pii(u)(1−θj)−A−θipimi < pij(u)(1−θi)−A−θjpimj at u ∈ (um, u˜i].
Using (5) and (6), for u¯ to exist within (um, u˜i] and for x
∗
i and x
∗
j to be well defined, it must
be that u¯→ u˜i such that x∗i → 0 and x∗j → 1. Given this, we know limA→0 Π¯i = θipimi and
limA→0 Π¯j = limA→0(1 − θi)pij(u¯) = (1 − θi)pij
(
pi−1i
(
θipi
m
i
1−θj
))
> θjpi
m
j . Further, from (8),
we know limA→0 Fi(u) = limA→0
Π¯j−θjpij(u)
(1−θ)pij(u) and limA→0 Fj(u) = limA→0
Π¯i−θipii(u)
(1−θ)pii(u) . Finally,
from (7), αj → 1, while firm i advertises with probability limA→0 αi = 1− Π¯j−θjpi
m
j
(1−θ)pimj ∈ (0, 1).
This limit equilibrium converges to the equilibrium of a model that allows for A = 0
explicitly without our tie-break rule. There, both firms advertise with probability one
and use equivalent utility distributions except that firm i advertises um with a probability
mass equivalent to limA→0(1− αi).
To show how this connects to much of the past literature which has considered various
asymmetries in non-shopper shares, product values and/or costs under unit demand and
the restriction, Ai = Aj = 0, consider the following example. Suppose consumers have
unit demands. From above, the equilibrium then depends upon u˜1 ≷ u˜2, or (1− θ1)(V1 −
c1)− (1− θ2)(V2 − c2) ≶ 0. For instance, when this is negative, x∗1 → 0 and x∗2 → 1, such
that Π¯1 → θ1(V1 − c1), and Π¯2 → (1 − θ1)[(V2 − c2) − u¯], where u¯ →
(
(1−θ)(V1−c1)
1−θ2
)
. By
then denoting ∆V = V1 − V2, and noting that F1(u2) = Pr(u1 ≤ u2) = 1− F1(p2 + ∆V )
and F2(u1) = 1 − F2(p1 − ∆V ), it follows that F1(p) = 1 −
[
Π¯2−θ2(p−∆V−c2)
(1−θ)(p−∆V−c2)
]
= 1 +
θ2
1−θ − (1−θ1)(θ1(V1−c1)+(1−θ2)(c1−c2−∆V ))(1−θ2)(1−θ)(p−∆V−c2) on [V1 − u¯, V1) and F2(p) = 1 −
[
Π¯1−θ1(p+∆V−c1)
(1−θ)(p+∆V−c1)
]
=
1−
[
θ1(V2−p)
(1−θ)(p+∆V−c1)
]
on [V2−u¯, V2), where α2 → 1 but where firm 1 refrains from advertising
with probability 1− α1 = 1− F1(V1) ∈ (0, 1).
C2: Relaxing the Single Visit Assumption
Here, we explain how the model can be generalized to allow the shoppers to sequentially
visit multiple firms. We focus on duopoly - similar (more lengthy) arguments can also
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be made for n > 2 firms. Suppose the cost of visiting any first firm is s(1) and the
cost of visiting any second firm is s(2). The main model implicitly assumes s(1) = 0
and s(2) = ∞. However, we now use some arguments related to the Diamond paradox
(Diamond, 1971) to show that our equilibrium remains under sequential visits for any
s(2) > 0 provided that i) the costs of any first visit are not too large, s(1) ∈ [0, um),
and ii) shoppers can only purchase from a single firm. The latter ‘one-stop shopping’
assumption is frequently assumed in consumer search models and the wider literature on
price discrimination.
First, suppose s(1) ∈ [0, um) but maintain s(2) = ∞. Beyond s(1) = 0, this now
permits cases where s(1) ∈ (0, um) provided um > 0 as consistent with downward-sloping
demand and linear prices. In this case, shoppers will still be willing to make a first visit
and the equilibrium will remain unchanged.
Second, suppose s(1) ∈ [0, um) but allow for any s(2) > 0 subject to a persistent
‘one-stop shopping’ assumption such that shoppers cannot buy from more than one firm.
By assumption, the behavior of the non-shoppers will remain unchanged. Therefore, to
demonstrate that our equilibrium remains robust, we need to show that shoppers will
endogenously refrain from making a second visit. Initially suppose that the firms keep
playing their original equilibrium strategies and that a given shopper receives h ∈ {0, 1, 2}
adverts. Given s(2) > 0 and one-stop shopping, the gains from any second visit will always
be strictly negative for all h. In particular, if h = 0, then any second visit would be sub-
optimal as both firms will offer um. Alternatively, if h ≥ 1, then a shopper will first visit
the firm with the highest advertised utility, u∗ > um, and any second visit will be be
sub-optimal as it will necessarily offer u < u∗. Now suppose that the firms can deviate
from their original equilibrium strategies. To see that the logic still holds, note that only
the behavior of any non-advertising firms is relevant and that such firms are unable to
influence any second visit decisions due to their inability to communicate or commit to
any u < um. Hence, firms’ advertising and utility incentives remain unchanged and the
original equilibrium still applies.
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